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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay is about the main chance. It is presumptuous and risky.
Presumptuous because it purports to identify the values and concerns that
should occupy center stage when we decide how to structure court-connected
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs. Risky because it will be
irrelevant to policymakers who do not agree (either as a matter of philosophic
election or fiscal necessity) that the values and concerns I identify should or
can play ascendant roles in this comparative analysis.
I believe, however, that it is very important, at the outset of a process of
making policy decisions like these, to pressure ourselves to identify the values
that are most important to us-so that when we make the choices among
structural alternatives that we must make, we will be sure to advance and
protect those values to the maximum extent possible. One purpose of this
Essay, then, is to provoke self-consciousness and debate about values-to
press us to identify and prioritize our goals, interests, and concerns.
This Essay's second purpose is to use the values that I think are most
important to conduct a comparative assessment of the five most common ways
of structuring court-connected mediation programs. I would like to contribute
toward refining our thinking about the implications of each alternative model
for the values that are most important to us. We will find that a complex
picture emerges even when we limit our field of vision to these ascendant
values-that each model presents a rich constellation of pros and cons-and
that we are forced to make difficult choices even among our most precious
values when we try to decide which alternative is, ultimately, the most
attractive. We also will find that our analysis (and the choice to which it
points) will vary with the purposes and characteristics of the particular
program in question. Different ADR programs may well have different
fundamental purposes-and there already is immense diversity in the
characteristics and circumstances of court-connected ADR programs around
the country.
The ascendant purposes of programs can range from simply getting more
cases settled (or settled earlier), to providing process alternatives that better
fit the needs or circumstances of some litigants than traditional adversary
litigation (thus encouraging a perception of courts as service-oriented
institutions), to enhancing the parties' sense of and capacity for self-
determination, to encouraging parties to reorient their primary instincts and
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to elevate concern for others, or for the social whole, above concern for self.1
Similarly, there can be quite a range in the level of ambition that accompanies
a court's program: one court, for example, might care only about how its
program directly affects the court (e.g., its docket pressures and its economic
burdens), while another court might want its program to have broader
effects-contributing to changes in the legal culture, or perhaps more
generally to social dynamics and to the political and economic character and
health of our society. The courts' visions, in other words, can range from
dockets to democracy.
What is important to acknowledge at this point is that how a court defines
the primary purpose of its program, and how that court prioritizes the values
and interests its program could serve, could dramatically affect that court's
thinking about which model or system for delivering ADR services is most
attractive.
At a less abstract, but arguably no less important level, there are a host of
different program and circumstance variables that could substantially affect
what the pros and cons of the different ADR delivery systems might be. Thus,
what those pros and cons are might depend significantly on, among other
things, the kinds of cases being served;2 the kinds of parties who generally
participate; whether the parties are represented by lawyers or other
professionals; what kinds of people serve as the neutrals (e.g., lawyers,
judges, professionals from other disciplines, or citizens without professional
affiliation or background); the character of the role the neutral is to play (e.g.,
purely facilitative, or in some measure evaluative, or helping the parties
devise case development plans); what powers, if any, the court confers on the
neutrals and what kind of training and monitoring they receive; whether
participation in the ADR program is voluntary (really) or mandatory (as a
matter of rule or of sociological reality); whether the parties are required to
pay for the ADR services (and, if so, how substantial those charges are); the
court's budget constraints; as well as the magnitude of docket pressures and
I Citations to sources that elaborate some of these kinds of purposes are presented
infra notes 10-12.
2 The range of case types that court-connected ADR programs have served is very
broad and includes, among others, neighborhood disputes, criminal matters (usually at the
petty offense or misdemeanor level), family law, probate, auto personal injury, general
civil, complex commercial or intellectual property, proceedings in bankruptcy, civil rights,
and matters pending at the appellate level.
[Vol. 14:3 19991
COMPARING STRUCTURES FOR DELIVERY OF ADR SERVICES BY COURTS
the time frames within which the court can deliver key elements of traditional
litigation services (e.g., trial dates and rulings on major motions). 3
The relative attractiveness of the different models also can depend on local
or regional demographic and cultural variables. For example, the nature and
severity of conflict of interest problems for neutrals, and the implications of
ceilings on what courts could pay neutrals, might be quite different for a court
in a rural setting than for a court in a major metropolitan area. And even
among courts that are similarly situated demographically there can be
considerable differences in local legal culture-especially in the extent to
which that culture has embraced ADR generally and can produce motivated,
skilled neutrals who are willing to serve in a court's program, perhaps for
relatively modest compensation or for no pay at all.
In addition, we must acknowledge that the play among variables like those
identified in the preceding paragraphs can change over time-with, among
other things, the maturity of a court's program, the evolution of the local
ADR culture, changes in budget constraints, and changes in the characteristics
of the court's docket.
So when we try to compare the pros and cons of the different models or
systems that might be used for delivering ADR services, we confront a
situation that is simultaneously fluid and extremely complex. These facts of
life have several consequences. One is to make the task of formulating reliable
policy in this arena an ongoing challenge, an undertaking that must continue,
at least at some level of self-assessment, indefinitely. Courts must build in
systems for periodic review of their objectives, their circumstances, and the
effectiveness of their programs (measured against their own re-assessed
objectives and prioritized values). And when selecting a system for delivering
ADR services, courts should try to make judgments about the likelihood that
they will need to make changes in their system, and how radical those changes
might be. These kinds of predictions can help courts ascribe relative
importance to one of the features with respect to which there might be
3 In this Essay I assume that the ADR processes in all of the programs that we are
comparing are fully nonbinding, meaning, among other things, that the participants are
under no duty to reach an agreement, that the mediator has no power to impose an
outcome, and that no party faces the risk of any kind of sanction or penalty for declining
either to enter an agreement or to follow any suggestion or course of action that the
mediator might recommend. "Binding mediation" is an oxymoron, and using "negative
incentives" or threats of penalties to pressure parties into anything more than participating
in a mediation session itself would pose serious threats not only to the values that inform
mediation theory, but also to the values (identified in the next section of the text) that I
believe every court-connected ADR program should strive to promote.
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significant differences between the models: how adaptable they are and what
the institutional and political or sociological barriers to changing them might
be. 4
Even without worrying about changes over time, however, the reach and
diversity of current state court ADR programs makes the job of comparing the
different models for delivering ADR services extraordinarily difficult and
analytically dangerous. The difficulty is a function of the huge number of
variables that could significantly affect the character and outcome of the
analysis. The danger is a function of the fact that we cannot assume that
conclusions that are valid for one program, in one specific setting, will be
valid for programs in other, inevitably somewhat different settings.
Having acknowledged all of these considerations, we also must face the
fact that at least in some courts or court systems some policy decisions must
be made now, for and in the circumstances that exist today. Spurred by that
fact of life, each of us who has been asked to contribute an essay to this
project hopes that we can (1) provide some food for comparative thought to
the policy makers who must decide now how to structure their ADR
programs, (2) identify some important questions that we cannot answer
confidently with the information currently available-and in so doing suggest
issues that empirical research might productively explore, 5 and (3) despite the
thicket of variables that surrounds us, identify some pros and some cons that
are likely to attach to the different models in a range of settings-in the hope
that some of the analysis we can make now will be useful to people working
4 Judgments about the relative adaptability of the different models can be difficult, and
can vary substantially from setting to setting. Just as an example, I note that the difficulty
of changing a system in which a court has formed a partnership with an outside institution
can depend on a host of variables, including how much capacity for flexibility that outside
institution has and the magnitude of its political clout. Similarly, how hard it might be to
change a system in which the ADR services are provided by private individuals who are
paid by the court or the parties could depend, in part, on the extent to which those
individuals have come to depend on income from this work, how large and cohesive the
group is, and how well connected its members are.
5 The severity of the problem posed by the thinness of the empirical base for making
these comparisons varies in some measure with the nature of the values or program
characteristics that are being compared. For some of the abstract or philosophic values that
I believe should drive the comparisons, the relative scarcity of empirical data is not
disabling. On the other hand, readers will see that many of the points I make are based on
assumptions about human nature, guesses about how different program characteristics are
likely to make most parties feel, and "common sense"-which is likely to be a euphemism
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in several different kinds of program environments. 6
6 Even though the administrators of ADR programs in five states have provided me
with a great deal of information over the past several months, what I write and think about
court involvement in ADR is likely to be influenced, in ways I do not always appreciate,
by my experience with the ADR program in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. I should disclose, therefore, some basic facts about that
program. See generally N.D. CAL. ALTERNATrVE Disp. RESOL. LOCAL R. (1998).
It began in 1978 with a mandatory, nonbinding arbitration program that primarily
reached contract and personal injury cases involving less than $100,000 in money damages.
In the mid-1980s we added an early neutral evaluation program that reached a wide range
of civil actions, and in the early 1990s we added mediation and a multi-option program. See
N.D. CAL. ALTERNATrVE Disp. RESOL. LOcAL R. 3, 5 (1998). In the spring of 1999, the
court decided to extend the multi-option program, with modifications, to all judges in all
of the court's divisions.
Program design and implementation relied on "borrowed" time from one magistratejudge (me) and from a few members of the Clerk's office until the Civil Justice Reform Act
(CJRA) permitted us to hire professionals in 1991. Since then, two lawyers with substantial
experience in ADR and in civil litigation have run the program, under my general
oversight. While these lawyers occasionally serve as neutrals, the vast majority of their
time is devoted to program design, training, rule writing, program evaluation, and higher
level program administration. They have been assisted, indispensably, by a professional
administrator (who now has a masters degree in public policy and administration) and by
two or three case systems administrators.
Our ADR program has reached a wide range of civil cases, but not matters involving
family law, probate, or criminal prosecutions. Our program serves parties proceeding in
propria persona primarily through settlement conferences with magistrate judges-only
rarely are in propria persona cases admitted to the arbitration, early neutral evaluation
(ENE), or mediation programs.
Only lawyers and judges have served as neutrals in our program-though we are
exploring now the possibility of using other professionals in some settings (e.g.,
comediating with a lawyer neutral). The ADR program in our bankruptcy court, which was
independently designed and is separately administered, sometimes uses accountants or
people with pertinent business backgrounds as neutrals.
The vast majority of the neutrals who serve in our mediation and ENE programs are
private lawyers who are not paid for their work-they volunteer to be trained and they
agree to serve in three or more cases a year without compensation. Our rules permit
compensation for the neutrals in these programs only in unusual cases, in which the neutral
serves for more than several hours. "Arbitrators" in our nonbinding program are
compensated at below market rates ($250 per day if serving alone) with funds provided by
Congress. No fee is charged to the parties for participation in the ADR programs.
For a relatively recent study of how the program operates in the Northern District and
how lawyers, litigants, and judges perceive its pluses and minuses, see DONNA STIENSTRA
Er AL., REPORT TO THE JuDIcIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION
AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FivE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
II. THE VALUES THAT SHOULD DOMINATE THE CHOICES WE MAKE
There are scores of different considerations, interests, values, and
concerns that decisionmakers could take into account when they compare
different ways of structuring court-connected ADR programs. That fact
creates a risk that when we make the comparisons we will lose track of the
main chance-that confusion or want of focus will lead us to make choices that
we would not make if we kept firmly in mind what is most important to us.
We also must acknowledge that, at least in some settings, some of the values
and interests that are at play here are mutually exclusive. So we must make
choices. Before we choose, we should have a clear idea of what our priorities
are-which values we can least afford to compromise or place in jeopardy.
A. Toward Defining "Quality Service" by Neutrals in Court-Sponsored
ADR Programs
To focus our discussion, I would like to begin by acknowledging what can
be a deep and difficult tension between two core values or interests-a tension
that designers of court-sponsored ADR programs perennially are required to
confront. This is the tension between quality and quantity-between, on the
one hand, insisting that the services provided by the neutrals in the court's
program are of very high quality and, on the other, the desire to offer ADR
services to the largest possible number of litigants.
Given the importance of democratizing access to justice, and to taxpayer-
supported governmental services generally, we should be prepared to live with
some reduction in our level of assurance that the work performed by every
ADR neutral is of the highest quality-if the trade-off is an ability to offer
valued dispute resolution help to appreciable numbers of litigants who
otherwise would not be served at all. But the public's capacity and willingness
to fund the courts and their programs is limited-in some places, very limited.
And access to private funding for court-sponsored ADR programs is legally
ESTABLiSHIED UNDER THE CIvIL JUSTICE REFORM AcT OF 1990, at 173-214 (1997)
(available from the Federal Judicial Center and on file with the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution) (report on the five federal district courts designated under the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 as demonstration districts for experimentation with different
systems of case management). Chapter IV of the report focuses on "The Northern District
of California's ADR and Multi-Option Programs." See id.
722
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and politically complicated, at a minimum. 7 Moreover, user-pay programs can
result in some classes of cases or litigants being effectively denied access to
these potentially valuable services.
These facts of life mean that there likely will always be real limits on the
resources that courts will be able to commit to their ADR programs. If those
real limits force courts to choose between volume and quality, I believe the
former always must be sacrificed for the latter.8 We should refuse to operate
7 For example, there appear to be substantial constraints of the federal courts'
authority to use funds from any source other than Congress to support the delivery of
services or the performance of functions that Congress requires the federal courts to deliver
or perform, or for which Congress makes appropriations (regardless of the sufficiency of
the amounts appropriated). Among other constraints, the prevailing view seems to be that
federal courts cannot use funds from private sources to "augment" appropriations by
Congress. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1994); 31 U.S.C. § 1517 (1994); see also Letter
from William R. Burchill, Jr., Associate Director and General Counsel, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, to Circuit Executive, United States Court of Appeals
(Dec. 9, 1994) (on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
These notations generate difficult questions when Congress imposes duties on federal
courts, authorizes appropriations to carry out the duties, but in fact appropriates no
money-as appears to have happened in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.
See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-658 (West Supp. 1999).
8 A decision to offer service to a smaller number of cases is not necessarily anti-
democratic and would not necessarily deny access to services to any class of cases or
litigants. One program design alternative is to identify the individual cases that will be
offered the ADR service through a process of random selection from within a wide range
of classes of cases. Some courts in Ohio have experimented with an approach of this kind.
See Memorandum from C. Eileen Pruett, Coordinator of Dispute Resolution Programs,
Supreme Court of Ohio (Oct. 16, 1998) (copy on file at the office of the Ohio State Journal
on Dispute Resolution). These courts take the position that "if mediation is being offered
as a court service it should be available to parties in the same ratio as the types of cases
filed." Id. at 6.
Under this approach, the court offers mediation to more automobile-personal injury
cases than to the more complex product liability cases-because there are many more cases
filed in the first category than in the second. See id. The Ohio courts who adopt this
approach justify it in part on the ground that mediating more of the larger cases would
consume a substantial percentage of the court's mediation resources-because the big cases
are more time consuming for the mediators-and would leave more of the smaller case
litigants without any access to mediation at all, because it usually is the smaller case
litigants who cannot afford to go into the private sector to pay for mediation services. See
id.
In the latter part of the 1980s the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California responded to resource constraints in its ENE program by deciding to assign to
the program only those cases that received an even docket number at the time of filing.
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a program that is any larger or more ambitious than we can support at a high
quality level-especially in programs where the court either requires
participation in an ADR process or generates considerable momentum in that
direction. Stated differently, if we are forced to choose, we should concentrate
our resources in smaller, higher quality programs-rather than strain our
resources to offer thin support for services in whose quality our confidence is
substantially compromised.
Having taken this position, I hasten to make three related concessions.
First, the concept of "quality" in this setting is not self-defining and is subject
to a range of views. Moreover, what quality consists of can vary, to some
extent at least, with the purposes and features of particular programs. I will
return to this topic momentarily.
Second, even if we can agree on a definition of "high quality
performance" by the ADR neutral, we are likely to discover that we do not
have a solid empirical basis for determining how important a high quality
performance really is. While, as I note later, some data has been collected that
sheds some light on this question, we hardly have a definitive answer. So we
are not sure how important high quality performance by the neutral is to
participants in ADR processes, or to achieving the goals of particular
programs-and we cannot be sure how big a threat poor quality performance
poses to values we hold dear. We also cannot be sure that answers we might
develop to these questions for any given program will be valid for other,
different programs.
Third, we do not really know how difficult it is to deliver high quality
service by our neutrals. For example, we are not sure how demanding the
criteria for service needs to be, what training is essential, or how much
monitoring is required.
It follows that one of the great empirical challenges we face is to develop
ways to determine how much of a decline in quality, if any, is likely to
accompany various degrees of expansion of the volume of cases a program
serves. The difficulty of this kind of empirical inquiry is compounded by the
likelihood that there will not be one uniform answer to this question that cuts
across all court and program lines. Rather, the answer seems likely to depend
on a host of variables, including, among others, the particular ADR process
involved, the kinds of people who serve as the neutrals, the roles the neutrals
are asked to play, the nature of the cases being served, whether parties usually
are represented by counsel or represent themselves, the level of training, and
administrative resources available.
I turn now to the challenge of trying to define "high quality performance"
by an ADR neutral and to defending the notion that assuring that quality is
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very important. What are the criteria by which we should define "high quality
performance" in these settings?
There are two different "spheres of reference" from which we could
reason in trying to respond to this question. One is very broad. In this broader
sphere, the values or concerns around which the debate revolves focus on the
ultimate purposes of mediationg9-as a distinctive process and form of human
interaction. The policymakers ask, in this larger sphere, what the primary
mission of mediation is and what larger philosophy guides it. The second
sphere of reference is smaller-but hardly unimportant. People working within
this sphere acknowledge that there are broader questions, and that how
policymakers answer those questions can play a major role in developing some
of the criteria by which "quality" is defined. But the focus within this second
sphere is on one core fact: that the ADR programs we are discussing are
sponsored by our public courts. Because of that core fact, I contend, there is
an irreducible group of characteristics of ADR processes and neutrals that
must be components of any broader set of criteria by which "quality" might
be defined. Before turning to the second, smaller sphere of reference, I should
describe briefly the kinds of matters that policymakers might debate in the
larger sphere.
As I said, the questions in this larger sphere are about ultimate purposes-
of mediation as a distinctive process (independent of the setting in which it is
being used). For some people, these are easy, almost self-answering questions.
They believe that the "ultimate" purpose of mediation is simply to get more
disputes settled, or settled sooner. 10 Other people have substantially greater
9 1 focus in this paragraph on mediation, rather than ADR more generally, because
mediation appears to be the most widely used ADR process and because there is far more
writing about purposes and processes with respect to mediation than with respect to any
other ADR mechanism.
10 For a sense of the spirit associated with these views, see for example Kenneth R.
Feinberg, A Procedure for the Voluntary Mediation of Disputes, in RISK AssEssMENT AND
RISK MANAGEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 179 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials
No. SD37, 1998); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Creative Use of ADR: The Court Appointed
Special Settlement Master, 59 ALB. L. REV. 881 (1996); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of
Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CmI. L. REV. 337
(1986). For descriptions of ranges of roles and styles of mediators, see Anthony T.
Accetta, Mediators as Problem Solvers, 23 CoLo. LAw. 561 (1994); Stephen G. Bullock
& Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Mediation Art: A Guide to
Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REv. 885 (1997); Samuel J. Imperati,
Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics and Stylistic Practices in Mediation,
33 WiLLAMErIa L. REV. 703 (1997); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators'
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ambitions for mediation. Some contend that its primary purpose is to enhance
understanding-by each party of its own situation and the situation of the other
parties. Others believe that the primary goal is to increase the parties'
involvement in, power over, and sense of responsibility for the resolution of
their problems. The phrase "party self-determination" is used in some quarters
to capture the spirit of these kinds of purposes."i Still other participants in the
"mediation movement" have even more ambitious goals. They contend that
the ultimate goal is not simply to improve party understanding and
involvement, but to encourage parties to elevate the needs and feelings of
others to a place of at least parity with (and sometimes ascendance over) their
own needs and feelings. In this school of thought, the ultimate purpose of
mediation is to encourage individuals to transcend themselves-to deepen their
concern about others and to intensify their sense of social connection. 12
What is deemed a high quality performance by a mediator might well be
quite different in a program whose dominant goal is to increase the incidence
(or to accelerate the timing) of settlement than in a program whose dominant
goal is to teach parties new ways of interacting with others and to encourage
them to attend more to the needs of others than to their own concerns. In
mediations with the latter purpose, a neutral is likely to be deemed to have
"performed well" only if she limits her role to certain fundamentals of
facilitation and only if she steadfastly encourages the parties to look back to
themselves, and to the dynamic between them, to find their own routes to
connection and solution. On the other hand, in mediations where maximizing
the likelihood of settlement is the main chance, the neutral will be deemed to
Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION
L. REv. 7 (1996).
11 See, e.g., GA. ALTERNATIVE DIsp. RESOL. R. app. C, § I ("[S]elf-determination
of the parties is the most critical principle underlying the mediation process. Control of the
outcome by the parties is the source of the power of the mediation process. Further, it is
the characteristic which may lead to an outcome superior to an adjudicated outcome."); see
also FLA. R. CERTIED & CT.-APPoINTED MEDIATORS 10.023 (Final Proposed Draft Aug.
1998) (circulated for public comment by the Office of the State Courts Administrator in
Tallahassee, Florida in August 1998 and contemplated for action by the Supreme Court of
Florida in February 1999).
12 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION
(1994); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and
Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1989); Joseph P.
Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Transformative Mediation and Third-Party Intervention:
Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach to Practice, 13 MEDIATION Q. 263 (1996).
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have "performed well" if she is clever enough to have played whatever roles
were required to lead the parties to an agreement. Often that means playing
multiple roles over the course of the mediation-shaping her behavior to meet
changing circumstances-engaging in a range of conduct that reaches from
passivity to strong intervention. But those who believe that the main chance
is simply getting the cases settled are far more likely to endorse assertive,
even aggressive behavior by neutrals than those who believe that mediation
must serve "larger" philosophic or societal purposes.
Lack of consensus about what the primary purposes of mediation should
be spawns lack of consensus about what the fundamental character of the
mediation process should consist of and what role the mediator should play.
Should mediation be strictly limited to facilitative processes? Should it include
the provision (by the neutral) of any kind of information? Should it include
any analytical, evaluative, or predictive inputs by the mediator? Does a
mediator have some responsibility to compensate for substantial imbalances
(intellectual, informational, emotional) in bargaining ability or power? Does
a mediator have some responsibility to assure that agreements reached are not
clearly unfair, or are likely to be honored, or are not illegal?
What attributes would be required of a high quality neutral obviously can
vary with the answers to these important policy questions. For example, in an
ADR program that is designed to include evaluative inputs about the merits of
claims, a high quality neutral would need to have analytical acumen and
substantive knowledge. In programs that prohibit or discourage evaluative
inputs by neutrals, on the other hand, it is not clear that these attributes would
be deemed important to the provision of quality service.
It is not clear that in our democratic society it is the courts that should
provide the answers to the questions about ultimate purposes that are debated
in this larger sphere of reference. Those answers are probably most
appropriately provided by legislative bodies. It follows that, absent clear
directives from the legislative branch, there are real limits on the kinds of
objectives that court-sponsored ADR programs can legitimately pursue-and
that it is not the courts' place to decide whether their programs should be used
to promote larger societal objectives like reorienting people's attitudes toward
one another.
This does not mean, however, that the goals or purposes of court-
sponsored ADR programs must be narrow or unimportant. The goal of an
ADR program that is sponsored by a public court cannot be simply to have the
disputing be over. The business of the courts is not business-it is justice. And
the dimension of justice for which courts are primarily responsible is process
faimess-which includes, among many other things, assuring that all people
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stand equal before the law and are greeted by the judicial system with the
same presumption of respect. It follows that the primary concern of any court
that sponsors an ADR program must be with the process fairness of the
services that are provided in that court's name. Those processes must be fully
respect-worthy.
Thus, when we shift focus to the second sphere of reference, the sphere
that is defined by the fact that it is the public courts that are sponsoring these
programs, there is a clear basis for the courts to insist that the services
provided by the neutrals meet some essential criteria. So the fact that a public
court is the sponsor of an ADR program necessarily makes some values
essential parts, at least, of the criteria that identify high quality performance-
regardless of which of the larger purposes any given ADR program is
designed to promote.
A mediator who works in a court-sponsored program will be viewed by
the parties and their lawyers, at least in some measure, 13 as an agent of the
court. A mediator who is so viewed must act in ways that conform to the most
fundamental norms by which our judicial institutions are guided. As public
institutions whose mission revolves around notions of justice, we can insist
that quality in our ADR programs include, at a minimum, neutrals and
processes that are dominated by moral integrity and that reflect a deep
commitment to procedural fairness. Thus, a high quality neutral must have the
ability to determine when that procedural fairness is in serious jeopardy and
to respond appropriately.
Because she is likely to be perceived as a representative of the court, a
mediator must behave in ways that will foster respect for judicial institutions.
She must be able to sustain in a variety of trying circumstances both
intellectual and emotional discipline over her own words and behavior, 14 and
she must be able and willing to follow carefully, when expected to do so,
prescribed sets of procedural protocols.
13 Many variables could affect the extent to which the parties view their ADR neutral
as an "agent of the court." One of those variables, as I discuss later in this Essay, is the
particular model for delivering ADR services that the court has adopted.
14 Among other attributes, a good neutral must be able to respond appropriately to
inappropriate behavior by others (e.g., to unchecked outbursts of anger, threats, or crude
attempts to dominate or manipulate others). A good neutral develops techniques for
responding to behavioral excesses in ways that will preserve the civility and integrity of the
ADR process without needlessly humiliating the misbehaving lawyer or party or destroying
any possibility of the ADR process yielding benefits.
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More specifically, a mediator in a court-sponsored program should not be
considered to have rendered high quality service unless she has remained
respectful of others and has strived to have others interact respectfully with
one another. She must have listened to everyone with the same open and
unbiased mind. She must have brought both intelligence and sensitivity to her
role-she must have thought clearly, been alert to subtleties (of
communication and of analysis), and been aware of and appropriately
responsive to people's feelings. She must have been able to put herself in
others' places-to view the world through eyes other than her own. She must
have both felt and projected a strong desire to help others, and she must have
brought considerable energy and commitment to her work. She must have
been scrupulously honest, and must not have resorted to emotional,
informational, or intellectual manipulation for any purpose (disclosed or
ulterior).
Thus, at its core, the concept of quality that emerges from the smaller of
our two spheres of reference focuses largely on the character of the dynamic
between the neutral and the parties, and on the ability of the neutral to lead the
parties to interact with one another in ways that are fundamentally respect-
worthy.' 5
15 1 appreciate that the way I have defined the core attributes of high quality
performance by a neutral glosses over some difficult issues. This fact is well illustrated by
the requirement that the neutral proceed with great "moral integrity." To me, that clearly
means at a minimum that the neutral cannot lie to, deceive, or manipulate any party. But
the requirement of moral integrity does not necessarily dictate clear answers to other, more
subtle questions. For example, what is the neutral to do when one of the parties appears to
be trying to manipulate the other party? Is the neutral responsible for assuring that all
participants in the process are "honest"? Does honesty by a party mean simply not lying,
or does it also mean taking affirmative steps to provide all information that is foreseeably
relevant to an informed decision by the other party? Does the requirement that the neutral
proceed with high moral integrity mean that the neutral must offer information (e.g., about
the law) that he or she believes a party needs in order to make an informed decision, or that
the neutral should discourage a party from accepting a settlement that the neutral believes
is unfair or unwise? How these difficult questions are answered can depend on the
underlying purposes and philosophy of a given ADR or mediation program, as well as on
the role that the court leads the parties to believe the neutral will be playing. It is
conceivable that, in different program settings, the requirement of high moral integrity
could be met even though these kinds of questions are answered differently.
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B. Does the Quality of the Neutrals' Work Matter?
I turn next to defense of the notion that high quality performance by the
neutral matters. There undoubtedly are people who would argue that my
concern about the quality of the neutral and of the mediation procedure is
precious, and that court programs contribute most to resolving disputes simply
by providing a settlement event, independent of its quality. What matters
most, under this view, is the occurrence of the mediation, not how well it is
handled. The central task, it is argued, is to get the parties to the mediation
and get them talking. Having done that, the rest of the event will take care of
itself. It is the crucible effect, in this view, and only the crucible effect, that
really matters.
This position could have two different kinds of underpinnings: one
empirical, the other philosophic. As I will discuss later in this section, some
empirical work has been done that sheds some light on this matter. 16 That
work is far from conclusive, however, so I hope that the studies that follow
this Essay will include a substantial effort to assess empirically the notion that
just having an ADR event is appreciably more important than its particular
character or the quality of the performance by the neutral. We certainly need
more real-world information in this arena.
But before we set out to gather that information, we must try to appreciate
how the philosophic dimensions of the debate could affect what kinds of
empirical information we look for. Specifically, we must acknowledge that
there are a number of different and sometimes conflicting values and interests
by which the "success" or "quality" of any given ADR program could be
measured. Among these, settlement rates may be the most obvious, but they
are not obviously the most important. Nor is any set of "efficiency" values,.
no matter how broadly cast (e.g., in terms of time, cost, or permanence of
disposition). Instead, we should at least seriously consider whether
measurement of the success or value or quality of court-sponsored programs
also should take into account a host of additional values.
As a first step in these explorations, let us examine some of the possible
philosophic underpinnings of the view that an ADR program will contribute
most to dispute resolution simply by providing a settlement event, independent
of its quality, or at least independent of the quality of the performance by the
neutral host. We cannot simply dismiss this view-in part because it is
supported by some challenging assumptions and some respect-worthy values.
16 See infra note 21.
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Among those, one of the most intriguing is the suggestion that my insistence
on the importance of quality in the neutral and quality in the process is
fundamentally antidemocratic. It could be argued that the distribution of the
traits of personality and the attributes of mind that are necessary to make
negotiated dispositions likely, and to make the process that produces those
dispositions fair and humane, is much broader than my concern about the
quality of performance by the neutrals would imply. The contention would be
that the social and intellectual skills that are essential to good mediations are
widely distributed among potential neutrals, among the representatives of
disputants (primarily lawyers), and among the disputants themselves.
Proponents of this competing view would say that because they are prepared
to place much greater confidence in the parties and their counsel, they need
not worry so much about what skills and attributes the neutrals bring to the
process.
A second, related set of assumptions supports this view. These begin with
the notion that, to be successful, the negotiation process need not be all that
subtly conducted. Instead, my challengers would contend, the process can and
should be simple, direct, and straightforward. The need for process
sophistication, they would argue, also is an elitist concoction, a figment of the
self-serving imagination of people who want to be paid several hundred dollars
an hour to serve as neutrals. In the vast majority of cases, this theory would
go, the disputants (or their lawyers) will listen to and understand one another
to the extent necessary, will not engage in behavior that destroys the
opportunity to exchange positions, will locate underlying interests as necessary
(which, they would argue, is appreciably less often than is fashionable in ADR
circles to assume), and, when the thin procedural dust settles, will reach an
agreement. Stated differently, the contention is that the ways litigants and the
neutral behave during a mediation carry much less risk of harm to the
prospects for success than the process purists would lead the policymakers to
believe. Thus, the role of the ADR program is to get the parties together, and
the role of the neutral is to keep them talking. Aided to this limited extent,
they will solve their own problems.
I hasten to add that we must be careful not to blur the views just described
with some of the broader schools of thought about the ultimate purposes of
mediation. As noted earlier in this Essay, some influential mediation theorists
subscribe to the view that the ultimate purpose of this process is to enhance
party self-determination, while others suggest that the ultimate goal is
transformation-of individuals and of their orientation toward and sense of
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connection with other people. 17 These related but distinguishable views have
deeply democratic roots-both hold that the mediation process should revolve
around the parties themselves, encouraging their empowerment and their
enlightenment (helping each participant increase her ability to hear and to
understand both herself and others).
It does not follow from views such as these, however, that mediation is
easy-or that it can be constructively handled by anyone with a modicum of
gray matter. To the contrary, at least some proponents of the views described
in the preceding paragraph are likely to place great emphasis on the need for
extensive training for prospective mediators-in part because these theorists
believe that to be a "good" mediator most people must "unlearn" deeply
ingrained instincts about problem solving, as well as entrenched patterns of
verbal behavior (instincts and behaviors that jeopardize attainment of the
ultimate purposes of mediation). 18 Thus, to be an effective neutral within these
philosophic frameworks requires the exercise of considerable discipline and
skill, along with a substantial reorientation of impulses. True to their
democratic roots, proponents of these theories probably would contend that
the potential to become a good mediator is widespread-but they would
concede that converting that potential to reality requires considerable effort.
But one need not subscribe to any particular view about the ultimate
purposes of mediation to be persuaded that it is extremely important, in a
court-sponsored ADR program, that the neutrals bring to their work both
process sophistication and attributes of character of the highest order. The
thoughts that follow support my view that courts should be reluctant to accept,
at least until empirically supported, the notion that the occurrence of the ADR
event is likely to be more important than its quality.
We must begin by focusing on the universe of matters that a court-
sponsored ADR program will serve. Court programs service a small subset of
the disputes that arise in our society. They are disputes that have survived to
become "cases"-matters sufficiently intractable to drive someone to launch
"litigation" (a notoriously unfriendly and burdensome process). Moreover,
most court programs service only a subset of filed cases-a subset of matters
that have survived for at least a few months on the docket. 19 So this is a
17 See sources cited supra note 12.
18 See, e.g., Folger & Bush, supra note 12.
19 There may be a few court-connected ADR programs that attempt to deliver services
to disputes that have not "ripened" into filed cases. And there are some programs that offer
mediation very early in the pretrial period, before the judiciary has any contact with the
case at all. But such early interventions are the exception, not the rule. In most of the court-
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universe of disputes that the parties did not settle before litigation was
launched and did not settle in the first few months after the complaint was
filed. The latter point takes on added significance when we note that at least
in federal courts somewhere between thirty and fifty-five percent of the civil
cases leave the docket before the court devotes any significant attention to
them-and often within about 120 days of filing.20 For many of the cases that
self-dispose within the first few months, it appears that the act of filing gets
the requisite parties' (or adjusters') attention and galvanizes settlement
energies.
All of this winnowing means that the cases that survive to a point where
they need the services of a court's ADR program are not representative of
disputes generally in our society. Instead, they represent a distinct minority-a
minority composed entirely of matters the parties have not been able to resolve
on their own. To assume that a substantial percentage of the litigants in this
narrower group might need (and welcome) some help resolving their
differences is neither insulting (to disputants who were able to resolve their
problems on their own or to anyone else) nor unfounded.
We turn next to the assertion that there is relatively little risk of harm to
prospects for success in the way the parties handle themselves in the mediation
and in the way the neutral performs. We respond at two levels: first by
questioning the real-world accuracy of the assertion, then by suggesting that
the definition of "success" in this assertion is far too narrow, at least for
programs sponsored by public institutions committed to pursuing justice.
Is it true that how the mediation process is handled (by the parties and the
neutral) has little impact on prospects for success (however measured)? I am
fairly certain that this is a question in want of an empirically reliable answer.
I also would not be surprised if the answer varies with the circumstances (e.g.,
with the kinds of cases being served in the ADR program and with the role
played in the ADR process by lawyers or other professionals representing the
connected programs I know about, the first ADR session does not occur until after the case
has been on file for at least several months.
20 Developing reliable findings about this matter is difficult from nationally maintained
statistics-but it is clear even from those statistics that about 20% of all civil cases will
remove themselves from the dockets of federal district courts "without court action." It also
is clear that an additional significant percentage of cases are resolved sometime "before
pretrial"-so that less than 15% survive to the pretrial conference. A much smaller
percentage actually goes to trial. It also is important to bear in mind that these percentages
can vary substantially between different categories of cases. See L. R. MECHAM, JUDICIL
Busmmss OF THE UNrrED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DnmCrOR tbls. CA, C-4A, C-5
(1997) (Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States).
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parties). But there is some data from previously conducted studies that
suggests that the level of satisfaction among participants with an ADR event,
and the likelihood that it will be productive, might depend more on the
character and skill of the neutral (on the quality of the service the neutral
provided) than on any other single factor.
Two independent studies of ADR programs in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California support this view. The first of
these studies embraced about one thousand cases that were assigned to the
ENE program between 1988 and 1992. After analyzing survey responses from
large numbers of lawyers and litigants, the scholars who conducted this study
concluded that "the most significant factors [affecting the likelihood of a
successful ENE session] are the personal characteristics of the evaluator and
the extent to which the evaluator follows the proposed procedure for
conducting an ENE session." 21 More pointedly, the researchers concluded that
"the individual evaluator's personal skills, attitudes, and behavior were by far
the most significant determinants of participant satisfaction with ENE."22
Just one of several bases for these findings was the fact that "[a]cross all
suit categories and within each class, the cases in which the highest-ranked
evaluators participated closed substantially earlier than those cases assigned
to evaluators ranked in the middle or bottom third."23 For example, "the
identity of the evaluator was a significantly more important factor than the
nature of suit in influencing the pendency time of a [sic] ENE case." 24 The
authors also found a strong correlation between attorney satisfaction with ENE
and their perception that the individual evaluator had prepared well for the
session.25
The second major study of lawyer and litigant views of ADR programs in
the Northern District was undertaken by the Federal Judicial Center and was
completed in early 1997.26 This more recent study included not only cases
participating in ENE, but also cases that had a mediation or a judicially-hosted
21 Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An
Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. Rav. 1487, 1515 (1994).
22 Id. at 1529.
23 Id. at 1510.
24 Id. at 1532.
25 See id. at 1523-1534.
26 See STIENSTRA Er AL., supra note 6, at 173.
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settlement conference. 27 After examining their survey data from multiple
perspectives, the Center's scholars found:
On every measure we have examined... attorneys' responses
varied by the quality of the neutral who conducted the ADR
session.... Attorneys who ranked the neutral near or at the
excellent end of the scale were significantly more likely to report
that the ADR process reduced litigation cost and time, that their
case settled through the ADR process, that the outcome was
satisfactory and the process fair, that the benefits of using ADR
outweighed the costs, and that they would volunteer a case for this
form of ADR [in the future].28
In sharp contrast, attorneys who gave their neutral a negative rating were
more likely to give the ADR process in which they participated negative
marks in most or all of these respects. 29 As the authors of this study pointed
out, "[tihe number of attorneys reporting an ineffective neutral was fairly
small-twenty-three out of 226 giving a negative rating and thirty-six giving
a middling rating-but their responses reveal that the impact of a poor neutral
is wide-ranging." 30
The thrust of these findings was not limited to the Northern California
program. In the two other jurisdictions whose ADR programs the Federal
Judicial Center studied under the mandate of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 (Western Missouri and Northern West Virginia), the lawyers whose
opinions were surveyed similarly reported that the quality of the neutral "was
an important factor in the effectiveness of the ADR process."31 Less
27 The study also included a few cases that participated in the court's nonbinding
arbitration program-but these represented only a tiny fraction of the total, so had little
bearing on overall assessments. See id. at 197.
28 Id. at 207-208; see also id. at 21, 174, 193.
29 See id. at 208.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 21. The lawyers were "particularly emphatic" about the importance of the
quality of the neutral in the survey responses in the Western District of Missouri-but in
assessing the significance of this data we must bear in mind that one person, an experienced
civil litigator who was employed full-time by the court, provided the neutral services in the
vast majority of the cases that the Federal Judicial Center's study reached.
RAND released its study of ADR programs in six federal district courts (by CJRA
mandate, different courts than those studied by the Federal Judicial Center) at about the
same time the Federal Judicial Center made its Report to the Judicial Conference, but the
RAND study did not squarely assess the impact of the quality of the neutral's performance.
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substantial support for the same inference has been offered by other studies
and commentary. 32
As impressive as the work just described has been, it is in no sense
definitive. For the most part, it relies on reported perceptions, and the size
and diversity of the study samples are limited. To date, we have no major
study that focuses on the importance of quality performance by the neutral in
mediation (as opposed to ENE or programs that include several ADR
processes), and we have no systematic empirical studies that would equip us
to determine whether the importance of the quality of the neutral's
See JAMES S. KAKAuK Er AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL
EVALUATION UNDER THE CIvIL JUSTICE REFORM Acr 29-51 (1996).
32 See, e.g., KARL SCHULTZ, FLORIDA'S ALTERNATIVE DISPuTE RESOLUTION
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT: AN EMPIRiCAL AssEssmENT 17-18 (1990); Carole Silver,
Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. REsOL. 37, 39-40 n.7 (1996); Joseph P. Tomain & Jo Anne Lutz, A Model for
Court-Annexed Mediation, 5 01]O ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 16-17 (1989) (noting that
failure to achieve settlement was far more often attributed to intransigence by a party than
to any aspect of the neutral's performance); Shaw, Selection, Training, and Qualification
of Neutrals 1 (Oct. 15-16, 1993) (working paper for the National Symposium on Court
Connected Dispute Resolution Research sponsored by the State Justice Institute and the
National Center for State Courts); Roselle L. Wissler, Evaluation of Settlement Week
Mediation 18 (Oct. 1997) (unpublished paper prepared for the Supreme Court of Ohio
Committee on Dispute Resolution, on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute
Resolution) [hereinafter Wissler, Evaluation of Settlement Week Mediation] (finding that
attorneys were likely to rate neutrals who had mediated 15 or more cases as more effective
than neutrals with less experience); Wissler, supra, at v (finding that "[a]ttorneys rated
mediators with substantive expertise as being more effective, even though expertise did not
increase the likelihood of settlement"); Roselle L. Wissler, Evaluation of the Pilot
Mediation Program in Clinton and Stark Counties, August 1996 Through March 1997, at
3-4, 17, 20, 22-23 (Sept. 1997) (unpublished paper prepared for the Supreme Court of
Ohio) (finding that if the mediator had prior experience litigating the kind of case that was
the subject of the mediation, the attorneys were more likely to rate the mediator as
effective, and the clients were more likely to believe that the mediator understood their
positions); see also David A. Dilts & Lawrence J. Haber, The Mediation of Contract
Disputes in the Iowa Public Sector, 18 J. COLLECTvE NEG TiATIONS PUB. SEcroR 145,
149-150 (1989) (noting an inability to determine whether differences in settlement rates
were attributable to differences in ADR techniques used or to differences in mediators'
skills, training, and experience, but noting that neutrals with deeper experience enjoyed
somewhat higher success rates than neutrals with less experience).
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performance varies with the kinds of cases served33 or with other important
factors.
While we await more thorough empirical exploration of these questions,
we are constrained to rely in substantial measure on judgment and on
prioritizing values. Stated differently, we must make educated guesses about
how litigants are likely to behave in these settings, and we must decide which
values we are least willing to risk when we make program design decisions
based on those guesses.
Based on many years of experience hosting settlement conferences, my
educated guessing greets with a fair amount of skepticism the notion that, for
the universe of hardy disputes that become cases that survive well into the
pretrial period, the parties, without neutral assistance, regularly will be able
to identify the kinds of behaviors and words that are likely to be
counterproductive or to provoke charged negative responses, then to discipline
themselves to steer their interactive style away from those danger zones, to
really listen to and understand one another, to appreciate all the analytical
angles from which the merits of the matter should be assessed, and to move
beyond purely positional bargaining-to identify real underlying interests and
to search creatively for ways to make those interests complimentary. To
expect any person to proceed in any setting in this way is to expect a lot; to
expect most parties and lawyers who have formalized their disputes into costly
litigation to behave this way, unaided, strikes me as unrealistic.
In my experience, parties to the hardy disputes that come before me in
settlement conferences often are either unable or disinclined to interact with
the opposing side in the manner that is necessary to maximize both the quality
of the dynamic and its prospects for contributing to a positive, consensual
disposition of the case. Without the guidance of the neutral, their behaviors
are likely to fall far short of the optimum model. This is not to say that they
are not likely, eventually, to settle their case. Most probably will. But it is to
say that it is only with the active assistance of the neutral that the quality of the
dynamic between the parties becomes fully respect-worthy-so that dynamic,
by itself, becomes a thing of value (as well as a force leading, perhaps sooner
than otherwise might be expected, to positive real-world results).
These notions-that the process should be fully respect-worthy and should
be something of value in itself-are the centerpieces of my contention that
33 It would not be wise simply to assume, for example, that the importance of the
quality of the neutral's performance is the same in family law matters and in commercial
litigation-or that what constitutes a high quality performance is the same in both settings-
even if the courts expected the neutrals to play essentially the same role in all the cases.
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courts which sponsor ADR processes should resolve program design issues in
favor of maximizing the likelihood that the neutrals will be of the highest
character and that the services they provide will be of the highest quality. An
ADR program that delivers less jeopardizes public confidence in and respect
for the courts. In sharp contrast, an ADR program that provides only high
quality service by neutrals increases the public's confidence in and respect for
our system of justice and, by giving the parties a service they really value,
increases their sense of gratitude toward the government and their sense of
connection to our society. The more respect for and gratitude toward the
courts the people feel, the more likely they are to respect the whole notion of
law, to feel the importance and to acknowledge the legitimacy of having
democratically developed norms govern relations within our country.
We can approach this same conclusion from a slightly different vantage
point. Courts are charged with performing what is probably the most
important function of government: peacefully resolving disputes and thus
giving order and stability to relationships that do not order and stabilize
themselves. Courts cannot perform this essential function unless the vast
majority of people in our society will comply peacefully with the courts'
decisions. Over time, in a democracy, the people will comply only if they
trust and respect the courts as institutions. It follows that we must take great
care to do nothing that jeopardizes that trust and respect. This is the main
chance. So when we design court-sponsored ADR programs our greatest
concern should be to preserve, at least, and to increase, if possible, the
people's respect for, confidence in, and gratitude toward our system of justice.
There is a risk that this view will be perceived as driven by institutional
selfishness and narcissism. As I hope other parts of this Essay make clear, my
interest is not in the courts per se, but in the much larger goal of promoting
a healthy social fabric by having the courts teach people ways of interacting,
processes for addressing differences in their perceived views and interests,
that have the effect of improving respect between individuals and increasing
the sense of connectedness without which an aggregation of people cannot
fairly be considered a society.
It is for these reasons that when, in the pages that follow, I compare the
various models for delivering ADR services, I will focus on the factors that
I think are likely to affect most the public's trust in and respect for the ADR
programs and the courts that sponsor them.
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III. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ADR PROGRAMS THAT ARE LIKELY TO
AFFECT MOST OF THE PUBLIC'S 4 TRUST AND RESPECT
What are the attributes of court-sponsored programs that are likely to be
most important to encouraging public respect and trust?35 Stated succinctly,
the attributes are the following: the public's perception of the motives and
purposes that inspire and drive the program, the extent to which fairness
permeates it, and the quality of the work performed and the value of the
service delivered by the neutrals.
As the pages that follow make clear, a considerable number of program
variables can affect the public's perception in each of these areas-but I
contend that the single factor of greatest significance is the quality of the
neutrals. More than anything else, it is their integrity, their commitment, their
sensitivity, their substantive knowledge, their process skill, their energy, and
their performance that will determine the level of respect and trust that the
program enjoys.
34 In considering these matters, we should bear in mind that the "public," for our
purposes, is not a simple monolith of voters or litigants, but is comprised of several
constituencies, not all of which will always have identically aligned interests and
perspectives. The public to which we must attend includes the general population (people
who are not involved in litigation, but who form impressions of the "system" and who
might someday be involved in litigation), litigants (from one-timers to repeat institutional
players), lawyers (from one-timers to repeat players), the persons who serve as the neutrals
in the ADR programs, judges, professional court administrators, and legislators and other
political leaders.
Our thinking about which models best promote public confidence may be more refined
and reliable if we keep in mind that our public is made up of these various components-
because some of the issues and concerns we will address are likely to be of greater moment
to some of these constituencies than to others and because, for different reasons, a healthy
program will need real support from all of these quarters. For example, a mediation
program that does not enjoy the confidence of the judges is in trouble, especially if referrals
to mediation are not mandated by administratively applied rule. And if litigants and lawyers
(especially repeat players) do not respect and trust the program, they either will not
participate at all, or will not bring the constructive attitude and level of preparation to the
mediations that are necessary to make the sessions productive.
35 "Respect" and "trust" may not always be coterminous here. For example, the
public might respect the purposes that inspire a mediation program and appreciate the good
will and good faith of the people who operate it, but not have confidence in (trust) the
competence (skills) of the neutrals. Similarly, the public could understand that a program
is well meaning but believe that the timing of the mediations makes them unproductive, or
that the character of the services provided by the neutrals is insufficiently sophisticated or
fails to meet the real needs of the parties.
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A. Respect and Trust
Public confidence in a program starts with public respect for the reasons
the program exists. Most of the constituencies in our "public" are not likely
to be enamored of a program whose primary perceived purpose is to reduce
the amount of work judges or court administrators have to do. So we must be
careful, when choosing among alternative models, to attend to their
implications for perceptions of our motives. Do some models increase (more
than others) the likelihood that important constituencies will conclude that the
program reflects an abdication of the judicial function, or an unauthorized
delegation of important parts of that function to persons not employed by and
not accountable to the public, or that the real purpose of the program is simply
to reduce docket pressures by erecting additional barriers (in cost and time)
to getting a day in court? A program that is perceived to be inspired by
institutional selfishness or laziness is likely to be greeted with something less
than unbridled enthusiasm in most quarters.
In a similar vein, perceptions of why the neutrals are serving, of what
their motives and incentives are, can affect public confidence in the program.
Do different models invite different inferences about these matters? Are there
significant differences between the models in the likelihood that participants
in the ADR programs will infer that the neutrals are motivated by money, by
a straightforward desire to perform a public service, or by ambition to serve
some private social agenda (to promote values that have not been legislatively
sanctioned)?
In this connection, we must examine the incentives that would surround
the neutrals' work. For example, do some models create greater temptations
for the neutrals to needlessly protract the ADR sessions (e.g., to increase the
neutrals' fees) or (at the opposite end of the spectrum) to give the mediation
assignment a kind of "quick and dirty" treatment that would invite disrespect?
Do some models create greater risks than others that the neutrals will use (or
be perceived as using) their participation in the program to build up their own
private practices, to bulk up their resumes for some other purpose, or to curry
favor with judges or court administrators?
There is a closely related set of considerations we also should bear in
mind. We need to think about what the public currently believes the role of
the courts should be in our society and about what we want the public to
believe the role of the courts should be. Do different models for delivering
ADR services send different messages about what the role of the courts in our
society is and should be? Do different models encourage different perceptions
about how the courts define their own mission-and about the scope and
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character of the services the courts believe they are responsible for providing?
Are some models more likely than others to encourage the public to conclude
that the courts define themselves essentially as service-oriented institutions,
that courts consider it their job to meet the real range of dispute resolution
needs of the full spectrum of disputants in our society, or that courts should
be leaders and role models in fashioning more constructive, healthy ways to
approach and resolve conflict?
Approaching these same questions from a different perspective, are some
models more likely than others to encourage the perception that courts (and
government, generally) are out of touch with the realities of many disputants'
situations or with important dispute resolution developments in the private
sector? Are some models more likely to invite an inference that the universe
of problems to which courts remain relevant is shrinking-and that it is limited
primarily to issues of moment to big business or to wealthy individuals? Are
some models more likely than others to encourage the perception that the
primary function of the courts is to lubricate the major cogs in the economic
machine, that the business of American courts really is business, and big
business, at that?
Generally, are some models more likely than others to enhance or to
diminish the public's sense of the importance of courts, and of democratically
generated law, in our society?
We also should consider what implications our choices among ADR
models might have for the debate about what the relative roles of the public
and private sectors should be in the provision of ADR services. Do we want
our choice to signal that the provision of ADR services should be primarily
by government, and by government directly? Do we want to signal that we
believe that most ADR services should be provided by the private sector?
Should we be concerned about whether our selection of a model reflects a vote
of confidence in, or reservations about, the capacity of the private sector to
deliver fair and reliable service in this arena? Do we want to signal that in the
vast majority of cases the people should solve their own problems, without
help funded by the taxpayers? Or, do we want the model we choose to
indicate that we think the healthiest approach involves balanced cooperation
and interdependence between the public and private sectors?
Additionally, we need to attend to the messages we send about the value
of ADR and about the relative importance of the kinds of cases and litigants
that the courts' ADR programs serve. Are some models more likely than
others to encourage an inference that courts (and government) view ADR
processes as inferior to traditional adversary litigation, as second rate means
of dealing with disputes? If so, or for any other reason, are some models more
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likely to lead the litigants who are ordered or urged to use ADR processes to
conclude that the courts view these litigants, or the kinds of disputes they are
involved in, as "second class"-as less deserving than other litigants or kinds
of cases of the full commitment of judicial resources?
The support of important constituencies will be jeopardized if an ADR
program appears to reflect a belief that some classes of cases or litigants are
less worthy of the attention of the courts than others. If users believe that they
and their class of case have been relegated to a second class system, or to an
inferior tier in some governmentally imposed hierarchy, earning their respect
and their full participation will be much more difficult. So we must consider
the implications of our choice of models for how users (and others) perceive
the quality of the service they receive. Are some models more likely than
others to encourage a perception that the program represents a valuable added
service, rather than a poor substitute for what would otherwise be perceived
as the real thing?
Public confidence also will be a function of the level of assurance the
public feels that the program in operation complies fully with the letter and
spirit of the formal rules that govern it. A program whose actual operation
varies appreciably from how it is described, formally, to the public, or that
falls visibly short of promises made about it, will discourage respect for the
institution that sponsors it and will invite inferences that the court really does
not care much about the program and really does not respect its value. So
when we compare programs, we should ask whether assuring real compliance
with the rules that govern it, and real fulfillment of its promoted promise, is
likely to be more difficult in some models than in others.
B. Fairness
There is a tight interdependence between the public's perception of a
program's motives and purposes and the public's perception of the program's
fairness. In selecting among ADR program models, we must consider whether
some models are appreciably more likely than others to generate a perception
and a reality of fairness. To refine our thinking about this important issue, we
must try to identify the variables (related to the choices among the models)
that are most likely to have a substantial effect on perceptions of fairness. The
thoughts that follow represent a start toward that goal.
Let us focus first on democratization of access. Do different models create
economic, procedural, or sociological barriers to participation of appreciably
different heights? In addition to differences in cost barriers, we should
consider whether some models are more likely to produce apprehension,
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intimidation, or distrust in potential users of ADR services, or to interpose
bureaucratic hurdles. What are the magnitudes of the differences between the
models in these arenas, and do all the differences cut in the same direction (or
do some favor one model, while others favor a different model)?
Next, we must consider whether some models create greater risks than
others that the mediators will be biased or perceived as biased. Freedom from
even a hint of bias is so important both to public confidence and to the
productivity of a mediation program that we must try not to overlook any
aspect of a program that might serve as a source of concern (in the public)
about the neutrality of the mediators. Thus, we must examine the impact of
our choice of model on such variables as the qualifications and backgrounds
of the neutrals, the composition of the corps or pool of neutrals, the process
by which the neutrals are selected, the source of any funds used to compensate
or reimburse them, the ties they retain after they begin serving, the other work
or activities they engage in while they remain connected with the court's
program, as well as the mechanisms for clearing for conflicts of interest, for
training, for monitoring performance, and for responding to allegations of
inappropriate conduct. We also must look at the neutrals' ties to the court, or
to individual judges, and to the rules that govern their communication with the
court.
Among the factors just listed, one warrants elaboration at this juncture.
We should pay special attention to how our choice of model affects our
capacity to develop a panel or pool of neutrals that contains the degree and
kind of diversity that is appropriate to the particular ADR program we are
implementing. Some models offer opportunities to develop pools of neutrals
that are much larger and more diverse than can be developed under other
models-and for some ADR programs, levels of public confidence, and
perceptions of fairness, might depend substantially on achieving certain kinds
of diversity or balance in the pool of neutrals.
Which elements of diversity are most important to perceptions of fairness
might well vary from ADR program to ADR program. In some program
settings, what might be most important is balance in professional background
(e.g., between plaintiffs' and defense lawyers), while in other program
settings the elements of needed diversity might be subject matter expertise,
particular life experiences, or professional training (e.g., in some family law
or juvenile court programs), race, national origin, gender, and sexual
orientation. Program designers should try to develop a sense of whether-and
to what extent-any particular kind of diversity or balance in the pool of
neutrals is important to public confidence in the fairness of their ADR
services. Because some kinds of diversity might not be achievable through
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some models, these kinds of considerations could have a major impact on
choice of model in a court that has concluded that achieving a certain kind of
diversity is very important to securing public trust in that court's ADR
program.
At this juncture we shift focus to a factor whose potential impact on
perceptions of fairness in an ADR program might be less obvious: the roles
the neutrals are asked to play. Are certain models more likely than others to
push the neutrals to play more analytically active, evaluative, or directive
roles? This question is relevant to public perception of the fairness of the
proceedings for at least the following two reasons: (1) the risk that the neutral
will make a substantive error (and, in that sense, be "unfair") increases with
the extent to which the neutral feels constrained to make substantive inputs and
(2) it is possible that the risk that the neutral will be perceived as biased
increases with the extent to which the neutral makes evaluative inputs or
directive suggestions.
This is another area in which we need much more empirical research. Is
the more analytically assertive neutral more likely to be perceived as biased?
Or does the level of risk of perception of bias depend not on whether the
neutral is evaluative, but on the form, timing, or character of the neutral's
evaluative inputs? Or does the level of risk of perception of bias increase only
when the neutral suggests what the terms of settlement should be?36 And how
great are these increases in risk, if any? Are any such increases offset, in the
minds of users of the ADR services, by perceived utility of evaluative inputs
or directive suggestions?
A sense of unfairness also could be provoked in parties who believed they
were being pressured to reach an agreement or to accept the neutral's views-
so we need to determine whether different models are likely to generate
different degrees of pressure on the neutrals to get cases settled, or to bend the
rules or exceed their authority in order to claim some other kind of
36 There is some data from Ohio that suggests that the risk of perception of bias
increases when the neutral recommends specific terms of a settlement, but not when the
neutral just offers some analytical feedback. See Wissler, Evaluation of Settlement Week
Mediation, supra note 32, at 30. On the other hand, parties to mediations in family court
in Maine understood the mediators to be recommending particular settlement terms in about
half the cases, but still rated the mediation process as fair and the neutrals as even-handed
in well over 90% of the cases. See Market Decisions, Inc., "Trapping the Data":
Mediation Programs in Maine 16-23 (Sept. 1997) (unpublished report about mediation in
family court in Maine prepared for the Court Alternative Dispute Resolution Service
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accomplishment. Stated more generally, we should look for pressures that
might lead to distortions of appropriate roles by the neutrals.
Shifting focus to another fairness concern (of lesser apparent moment than
those just mentioned), we also should ask whether different models create
different levels of risk that lawyers who have served the court as mediators
will be perceived as enjoying an unfair advantage over lawyers who have not
so served. If the judges of a court know that certain lawyers or firms perform
valued service for the court as mediators, other lawyers might be concerned
that the judges would feel indebted to those mediator-lawyers (concerned that
the judges would feel that they owe their mediators a favor). If those mediator-
lawyers appear in other contested cases in front of the same judges, the parties
who are represented by counsel who have not served the court might feel
disadvantaged.
A more subtle variation on this theme can arise when the judges pick or
approve or help train the lawyers who serve as their mediators. It might occur
to parties whose opponent is represented by a lawyer who has served the court
as a mediator that they are at a disadvantage not as a result of some sense of
indebtedness by the court, but because the court might have greater confidence
in the integrity, intelligence, or judgment of the lawyer whose ability the court
already has endorsed (or whom the court has trained and certified to serve as
a representative of the court in the mediation program).
C. The Quality of the Neutrals and the Service They Provide
When we compare structural alternatives for delivering ADR services, we
should attend with special care to the possibility that different models offer
different degrees of assurance that the people who serve as the neutrals, and
the service they actually provide, will be of the highest possible quality.
These are matters of both perception and reality. For example, we need
to ask whether different models offer neutrals different degrees of presumptive
status or respect in the eyes of the affected constituencies. A related inquiry
would focus on whether there are differences between the models in the
protections (legal, practical, or sociological) they offer to the neutrals from
unfounded complaints or from lawsuits by disgruntled participants-there
could be a relationship between the capacity of the program to attract and
retain high quality neutrals and the level of protection the program offers to
its mediators.
But there are other points of comparison that are likely to yield findings
of greater significance to our concern about quality in the neutrals. As part of
our larger inquiry, we must compare the different models' capacity for quality
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control. 37 Do the different models pose different challenges to achieving
quality control? Do the risks of quality control failures vary appreciably from
model to model (e.g., is the risk greater, under some models, that the courts
will lose touch with what is actually being done in the programs under their
sponsorship)? Are the sources of risk to quality control different in the
different models? Are there substantial differences between the models in the
cost of achieving quality control?
More specifically, are there differences between the models in the quality
of the people who can be recruited to serve as the mediators, or in the ability
of the court to attract neutrals who have the needed subject matter expertise
or the appropriate diversity of backgrounds and experience? Do some models
offer greater ability to retain (over time) the services of high quality neutrals?
Do some models offer significant advantages over others in training the
neutrals? Is the angle of the neutrals' learning curve likely to be appreciably
steeper 38 under some models than under others? Is any one model the most
likely to yield performances by neutrals that are most skillful and
sophisticated? Do some models promise advantages in monitoring and
disciplining the neutrals' performances, in analyzing the effectiveness of their
work, or in providing users of the system with opportunities to comment about
and assess the way the neutrals function? Is recruiting, training, monitoring,
or evaluating effectiveness likely to be appreciably more expensive under
some models than under others?
We also must examine the likely effects of the different models on how
well the neutrals perform. Do different models offer different levels of
incentive for the neutrals to commit the time and energy to the ADR process
that will be necessary to maximize its effectiveness? Is there a greater
likelihood under some models than under others that the neutrals will be
sufficiently patient and appropriately tenacious or that they will behave with
appropriate levels of restraint and dignity? And, as asked in relation to
perceptions of fairness, are some models more likely than others to generate
role-distorting pressures on the neutrals?
37 "Quality control" includes, at least, systems to assure both (1) that the people who
serve as the neutrals have the appropriate attributes (character, temperament, sensitivity,
skill, experience, knowledge, energy, and tenacity) and (2) that when the neutrals actually
perform, they discipline themselves to comply with both the letter and spirit of the
program's rules.
38 Another way to express this idea is to focus on the "compactness" of the neutrals'
learning: how fast do they acquire the most important skills and sensitivities, and how well
do they retain these skills and sensitivities from one mediation to the next?
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Using these questions and concerns to guide our comparison of the models
should enable us to make more reliable judgments about which models (at
least in specified settings39) are likely to generate the highest levels of public
confidence and to provide the most valuable services to users of the ADR
programs.
IV. THE MODELS
We have been asked to compare the following five4 "models" that courts
might use for delivering ADR services.
A. Full-Time In-House Neutrals
In this model, the court hires and pays with public funds the people who
serve as the mediators. The mediators are full-time employees of the court.
Mediation services in the court's program are not provided from any other
source.
B. Court Contracts with a Nonprofit Organization That Provides the
Neutrals and Administers the Program
This model could be implemented in either of two ways. Under one
variation, the parties are charged either nothing or only a nominal fee for the
services performed by the neutrals, and the neutrals either are not paid at all
or are paid far below market rates with money that is provided by the court
through the contract with the nonprofit organization. Under the other
variation, the parties are charged more substantial fees (approaching market
rates) for the neutral's services-while neither the court nor the nonprofit
39 By "settings" I mean sets of program variables like the kinds of cases involved
(e.g., subject matter, amount in controversy, numbers of parties), whether participation is
mandatory or voluntary, and whether most participants are represented by lawyers during
the mediation sessions. The outcome of our comparative analysis could vary with different
sets of assumptions about these variables.
40 Other commentators may describe the models somewhat differently and may
identify six (or more) models for discussion. The models are conceptual constructs which
we use primarily to explicate the issues we have been asked to address. They do not
purport to exhaust the universe of possibilities or to reflect all the variations that have been
adopted.
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organization that orchestrates the service by the neutrals makes any significant
contribution to the income received by the neutrals.
C. Court Directly Pays Private Individuals or Firms to Serve as
Neutrals
Under this model, the contractual relationship that underlies provision of
the neutral services is between the court and the neutral, not between the
parties and the neutral. The court, not the parties, pays the neutral's fees.
While the fees often are not as high as pure market rates would dictate (at least
for some of the neutrals), they are not nominal and could constitute a
significant portion of some neutrals' income. But the neutrals are not full-time
employees of the court. In most courts that operate under this model, the fees
are fixed on a per case basis, not per hour.
D. Court Orchestrates Services by Private Individuals Who Serve as
Neutrals Without Pay
Under this model, the court recruits, trains, monitors, and disciplines the
neutrals, who are private citizens who serve without pay and who generally
devote only a small percentage of their work life to service in this capacity.
Because the neutrals work on what is essentially a pro bono basis, there is
little or no charge to the parties for participation in the ADR program.
E. Court Refers Parties to Private Neutrals, Who Charge the Parties
Market Rates for Their Services
Under this model, there is no contractual or financial relationship between
the neutrals and the court. The court might establish some minimum criteria
for serving and might set up a clearing house list of people eligible to serve-
but the court's involvement in quality control is either nonexistent or modest.
The principal variations of the model include the following: (1) the court
ordering the parties to use a neutral that the court names; (2) the court
ordering the parties to select a neutral from an approved list; (3) the court
simply ordering the parties to go into the private market and find a neutral on
their own; or (4) the court accepting a stipulation by the parties that they will
participate with a neutral of their choice in an ADR session during a defined
period-during which, usually, the court suspends the case development
obligations the parties might otherwise have. Under all of the variations of this
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model, the parties end up paying, usually on a fifty-fifty basis, the market rate
fees of the neutral. In some programs, if an impecunious party is ordered to
participate in a mediation, either the neutral will waive her fee or the court
will pay it.
These are by no means the only "models" that courts have adopted for
providing ADR services. And some courts have developed hybrids of these
approaches, taking some features from one model and other features from
different models. It also is important to emphasize that no court need feel
compelled to choose just one of these models: it might make sense, for
example, to use one model for certain kinds of cases or in certain
circumstances and to use another model for others. 41 To give focus to our
exploration of the issues, however, and to permit readers to compare our
views, we have been asked to direct our remarks to these five models.
In keeping with the central theme of this Essay, I organize the discussion
that follows not around each model but around the values and concerns that
I think we should attend to most when we decide how to structure court-
sponsored ADR programs. Thus, each section focuses on a specific set of
values-and explores how well or how poorly the various models serve, or
how seriously they threaten, that set of values. To maintain some control over
the length of this Essay, I will not discuss separately each of the five models
with respect to every issue I raise-sometimes because the issue itself does not
warrant the extended discussion, sometimes because it is not clear that there
are substantial differences between some of the models with respect to the
value or concern being discussed. What I have not done, in part because doing
41 It is not clear that it would be wise to adopt more than one service-delivery model
for the same kinds of litigation or litigant-except, perhaps, as necessary to conduct fixed-
term experiments. Adopting more than one model for one class of cases could impose
substantial administrative burdens and would create considerable risk of administrative
error. Moreover, using two different models for similarly situated parties or cases creates
a risk that some litigants will feel that they are not being treated equally and are receiving
an inferior class of service (causing them to devalue and not take full advantage of the ADR
process itself).
This caution about using more than one service-delivery model for the same class of cases
does not necessarily apply to offering more than one kind of ADR process to cases in the same
class. It may make considerable sense to permit parties within categories of cases to select from
a menu of ADR process options (e.g., early neutral evaluation, mediation, arbitration,
nonbinding summary jury or bench trial, or judicially hosted settlement conferences). This
approach has been well received in several jurisdictions (including the multidoor courthouse
programs in the District of Columbia and in Oklahoma and the multi-option program in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California).
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it would miss the main point and in part because it would require a book-
length work, is to assess every implication, every possible pro and con, of
each of the five models.
As I have worked my way through the comparisons I describe in the pages
that follow, I have gravitated toward the feeling (not a firmly held conclusion)
that, for my purposes, there is one structural factor that accounts for the most
significant differences between the various systems for delivering ADR
services. That factor is whether the neutrals are employees of the court (court
staff) or not. Thus, much of the "comparing" in the remainder of this Essay
ends up being between the staff-neutrals model, on the one hand, and, on the
other, the models in which the neutrals are not employees of the court.42
V. COMPARING THE MODELS: PUBLIC TRUST
A. Perceptions of the Court's Motives and Its Belief in the Value of
ADR
Earning the public's trust in an ADR program is a complex undertaking-
dependent on a great many different factors. Some of these factors, like the
capacity to assure that the neutrals follow prescribed procedural protocols, we
will discuss in subsequent sections. In this section, we focus primarily on how
different program structures might affect the public's perception of the
motives that inspire the court's program; the public's perception of the
motives of the people who serve as neutrals; and the messages the different
structures are likely to send about how much the court values ADR, how the
court defines itself as an institution, and what the court believes its role should
be in our society.
At the outset we should make one important point clearly: perceptions of
a court's motives can be substantially affected by perceptions about how much
the court really values and respects the ADR process it sponsors. The more
the structure of a court's program encourages users to believe that the court
42 For the purposes of this Essay, a "staff-neutral" is an employee of the court who
commits all or a substantial percentage of her time to serving as a neutral in ADR
processes. I do not include in my definition of staff-neutrals persons who are paid (even
under some kind of contract) with public funds for performing neutral services on an hourly
or per-case basis. Rather, a staff-neutral, for my purposes, is a person who is directly
employed by the court and is paid a fixed salary that is independent of how many cases she
serves or how many hours she devotes to ADR sessions.
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believes in the program, the less likely users are to infer that institutionally
selfish (or worse) 43 motives led the court to adopt the program.
One major factor that could affect the public's perception of the motives
that underlie a court's ADR program, and how much the court values that
program, is money. A court that visibly uses its own precious resources to pay
the full cost of providing ADR services discourages the public from inferring
that the purpose of the ADR program is simply to reduce demands for the
court's services or to shunt work that the court should be doing off into the
private sector. Thus, courts that bear the full cost of their ADR programs are
less likely to encounter cynical inferences that what really inspires those
programs is a desire to dump cases into a supplementary process that will
make those cases go away.
Moreover, other things being equal (e.g., public pronouncements about
purpose and ethical rules), the public is more likely to believe that a court
really believes in a program if the court itself pays the full freight of that
program-and uses significant amounts of money to support ADR that the
court could use for other functions. By using its own money to pay for
mediation services, for example, the court signals that it believes that those
services represent real added value, not a poor substitute for more highly
esteemed traditional litigation.
More broadly, by visibly paying for the ADR services in its program, a
court most clearly indicates that it is assuming full responsibility for those
services-that the court is openly tying its public image to the quality of those
services, demonstrating that it has sufficient confidence in those services to
risk its public ego in them. It is by willingness to take these kinds of ego-risks,
and to commit real resources for which there is obvious competition, that a
court most clearly endorses its programs-and reassures the public that they
are in no sense "second class."
From this perspective, the courts that use their own full-time employees
to serve as the ADR neutrals inspire the greatest confidence that constructive
public values drive the ADR program. Stated differently, the public is not
likely to assume that a court would use its own money to provide directly in
its own name services that it believes are inferior or "second class." The next
most attractive model, from this perspective, is the one in which the courts use
their own money to pay the fees of private neutrals. In the latter model,
however, the court's commitment of its own funds may be less visible.
43 Courts should be especially concerned if parties infer that ADR programs are
inspired, in any measure, by judicial disdain for certain kinds of cases or disrespect for
certain kinds of rights or litigants.
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Moreover, because the rates paid to the neutrals usually are below market, the
message of commitment sent by the financing of this model may be less clear.
Nonetheless, the commitment of significant public resources gives this model
a confidence-inspiring edge over models in which the courts commit relatively
little, or none, of their own resources to provision of the ADR services. The
models that fare least well with respect to this factor are the models in which
the court merely sends the parties into the private market to arrange and pay
for the services of a private neutral and the models in which the courts
contract with another institution to provide the neutral services, but pay for
little more than administrative overhead.
Of course, a court could make a substantial financial commitment to its
ADR program without paying for the work the neutrals do. Some courts, for
example, commit several professional staff positions to designing and running
ambitious ADR programs-programs that serve so many cases that the staff
could not possibly provide the neutral services in a significant percentage of
referred matters. By making visible and substantial commitments of their own
resources to these programs, such courts also demonstrate a real commitment
to the value of ADR services-and thus discourage cynical inferences about
the purposes of their programs. But the strength of that message may be
greatest in courts that pay the full cost of the neutral services-and thus treat
the provision of these alternative services as comparable in value to the
traditional litigation services that the courts pay for in full.
There is another, related perspective from which to consider the role of
money. When neutrals receive no compensation, or when they are paid at well
below market rates, there may be a greater risk that the parties will devalue
their services-and infer that the court does not really value those services or
the program in which they are rendered. Courts can take steps to discourage
such inferences-e.g., through public, vigorous, and repeated affirmations of
their belief in the quality and value of the neutrals' work and through high-
visibility demonstrations of gratitude to the neutrals for their service. It is
difficult to sustain such public affirmations, however, and it is not clear that
they carry the same "message-clout" that money carries. And demonstrations
of gratitude by the court to neutrals, at least when they are also members of
the bar, can cause collateral problems.44
44 When a court appears to feel indebted to a lawyer who served as a neutral, and that
lawyer later appears before that court in other matters, there is a risk that opposing counsel
or parties in those other matters will question the evenness of the playing field.
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All of these kinds of concerns about "money-messages" tend to commend
the staff-neutral model and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the models in which
the courts visibly pay for the services performed by the neutrals.
There are additional features of the model in which the neutral services
are provided directly by court staff that militate against an inference that the
court views its ADR program as providing a second class form of justice. The
primary generalization here is this: the closer and more visible the connection
between the court and its ADR program, the clearer the court's signal that it
identifies itself with that program-and endorses its value and quality. That
crucial connection is diluted least in the staff-neutral model-where the people
who serve as the neutrals are part of the court and most obviously identified
by the parties with the court. In contrast, the institutional or professional
connection between the court and the neutrals is thinnest when the court
simply sends the parties into the private sector to find and pay their own
neutral, or when the court presents the parties with a long list of neutrals in
whose training and monitoring the court has been little involved.
Another factor that cuts in the same direction is the court's capacity to
maintain procedural track and time-control over the cases that participate in
an ADR program. The risk is greatest that the court will lose procedural track
of the cases, or that more time will be unjustifiably run off the pretrial clock
by the ADR referral, under models in which the court sends the cases to
outside ADR providers (individual or institutional). And the more control over
its cases a court appears to be willing to give up, the more likely the public is
to infer that the court does not really care about those cases-or cares less
about them (thinks they are less important) than the cases over which the court
insists on maintaining tight control (and to which the court provides directly,
at its own full expense, all the traditional adjudicatory services).
A court has the ability to keep the administration of its ADR program
under tightest rein under the staff-neutral model. Under this model, a court
can exercise more control over the timing of the ADR sessions and can
minimize the risk that the cases will float off into some procedural limbo for
protracted periods. 45
Generally, "sending" cases to outside providers increases the risk that the
parties will feel that the court is sending them away-because they are not
important or because the court does not want to be bothered by them.
45 Some ADR programs in Ohio courts report longer delays between the referral to
mediation and the holding of the session when the neutral is drawn from a pool of private
professionals than when the mediator is a fuill-time court employee. See Memorandum from
C. Eileen Pruett, supra note 8, at 7.
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Moreover, the risk that the parties will feel that the court is "sending them
away" increases when the ADR session is not conducted in the courthouse-
but in a conference room in a private office or in some other organization's
building. The physical act of being sent out of the courthouse to some other
place can suggest second-class status-and that the court does not care much
about or is not heavily involved in the events that take place outside its
physical domain. Being sent away physically also can distend the sense of
social and moral connection with the court system, and thus with the values
and behaviors that the system symbolizes and demands. The farther the parties
and the neutral are from the courthouse, physically, the farther they may be
in spirit and conduct as well. In some ways or circumstances, that separation
could be a positive development-if, for example, the spirit and conduct that
the parties associate with the courthouse is rigidly formalistic, alienating, and
verbally pugilistic. But to the extent that the parties associate the courthouse
with expectations that they will be on their best behavior, that high moral
standards will be used to guide and judge them, and that it is important to
honor rules of law, separation from the courthouse could open the way to
moral or behavioral lapses that would not occur inside the courthouse itself.
These negatives are least likely to surface under the staff-neutral model,
because it is under this model that cases are least likely to be sent away,
physically, from the courthouse for their ADR session. So this model creates
the least risk of a physical suggestion that the court is trying to get rid of the
cases it sends to ADR. The next best model, from this perspective, is one in
which the court pays neutrals from the private sector to provide the ADR
services-and encourages those outside providers to use courthouse facilities
as much as possible.
B. Inspiring Gratitude and a Sense That the Court Defines Itself as a
Service Institution
Surveys of litigants and lawyers in Ohio, and anecdotal experience in
other jurisdictions, have suggested that courts that provide ADR services can
earn something very important from parties: a sense of gratitude. When
parties perceive that the court's purpose in offering an ADR process is to help
the parties, not to discourage them from consuming the court's resources, they
are grateful. The parties are especially likely to be grateful when they believe
that the court is trying to identify the values and interests that the parties feel
are important-and then is trying to offer to the parties services that are
responsive to those party-defined values (as opposed to the court's own values
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or interests). For example, Ohio surveys showed that many litigants were
grateful for the opportunity the court gave them to save their own money and
time and to exchange views with opposing parties about the merits of the cases
in settings that were less formal and less intimidating than in traditional
litigation. 46
A lawyer who provides mediation services for a federal appellate court
provided me with another significant example. For years, a group of parents
had been in litigation with local school authorities, pressing for changes in the
educational system that the parents felt were extremely important. This
struggle was taking place in a community of modest size, in a relatively
remote region with little political clout, and the group of parents that had
pushed the case through the system to a federal court of appeals was in the
minority-effectively disenfranchised. They were deeply alienated. Then their
case was designated for the mediation program in the court of appeals. That
led, initially, to some phone conversations about procedures, positions, and
interests, then a decision by the mediator to fly hundreds of miles to a location
where all the parties could afford to convene for a mediation. The appellate
court program paid for the flight-and for all of the work by the mediator (she
was on the court's staff of professional mediators). The mediator devoted
considerable time to the ADR process-but it did not resolve the litigation.
From some important perspectives, however, this mediation was very
successful. The mediator spent a great deal of time with the parents, listening
carefully to the history of their dynamic with the local authorities and
community, and making sure that the parents understood that she, the
mediator, had developed a comprehensive grasp of the character of their
claims and the kind of changes they felt were necessary. The parents also
developed confidence that through the mediator they were able to
communicate accurately their feelings and views to the local authorities. When
the defendants would not make sufficient concessions to satisfy the parents,
they were disappointed. But they also were deeply grateful-not to the local
board, but to the mediator and to the court of appeals for providing her
services. After years of efforts at the local level and years of litigation, they
felt that the mediator was the first person who was connected in any way with
the power structure in our society who had really listened to them, the first
person who visibly took seriously the need to hear and try to understand their
grievances and their perception of their needs.
46 See Wissler, Evaluation of the Pilot Mediation Program in Clinton and Stark
Counties, supra note 32, at 7-8.
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This was extremely important to them because they were a minority and
had felt powerless and alienated. In the mediator, they saw, for the first time,
the "system" listening to them, caring about what they had experienced and
what they thought, trying to be responsive. And the mediation itself was a
process they could understand, in which they could participate, governed by
rules and overseen by a person they respected. Moreover, through the
mediator, the system had come to them-had flown hundreds of miles that
they could not afford to travel in order to give them an opportunity to try to
solve their problem. So even though the mediation did not yield the relief they
wanted, they were moved by the concern and the sensitivity they felt from the
mediator and by the generosity and outreach of the institution that sent her-
the court.
That gratiiude is important, without more. But there is more. When those
parents felt heard and served by the court, through its mediator, they felt less
alienated. They also felt respect for the process the court had provided-a
process that did not inspire fear and distrust, but that, instead, they could see
was designed to involve them directly and centrally in exploring their situation
and expressing their views. Gratitude and respect led them to feel, certainly
for the first time in relation to this dispute (about which they cared so much),
some sense of connection to at least one important part of the institutional
framework of our society-the court. Gratitude, respect, connection-these are
the main chance.
It also is important to emphasize that by taking the initiative and providing
the mediation service as it did, the court showed these parties by its own
actions (speaking louder than words) that it defines itself as a service
institution-that it believes that its mission is to help people resolve their
differences and to provide them with processes for doing so that are worthy
of respect (fair and sensitive) and that they can use without excessive stress
(economic or emotional).
The model for delivering ADR services that contributes the most to these
important values is the staff-neutral model. This model is most likely to inspire
a sense of gratitude to the court because it is clearer under this model than
under any other that it is the court that is the source of the service. Moreover,
it is in this model that the court itself most clearly acknowledges that its
traditional litigation procedures can be alienating, intimidating, stressful,
expensive, and slow-and that it is an essential part of the court's
responsibility to make available procedures for resolving disputes that provide
litigants an opportunity to avoid these aspects of the traditional approach. The
feeling of gratitude is likely to be greatest when the parties see that the court
understands its own limitations and is trying to add services which, in some
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circumstances, better fit the needs of the disputants. A court whose own staff
professionals provide the ADR services sends these messages most clearly.
Among the models we are considering here, the two that probably deliver
the least to these important values are those in which the court contracts with
an outside institution, which then administers the program and delivers the
ADR services, and those in which the court orders the parties to find their
own neutral (in the private sector) and to pay her fee. In these models, the
court is not providing the services directly and is not involved much in helping
the parties-so there is much less occasion to feel gratitude to the court and
much greater risk that the parties will believe that the court has sent them into
the Siberia of dispute resolution.
C. Perceptions of the Motives of the Neutrals and Presumptive Levels
of Respect
The model in which the ADR services are provided directly by
professionals who are employed full time by the court also seems to generate
the least risk that the public will have confidence-challenging questions about
the motives of the people who serve as the neutrals. Unlike models in which
the neutrals are from the private sector and earn roughly market-rate fees,
staff-neutrals are not likely to inspire concern that they are in it for the money.
The salaries for such positions are not likely to be high, and parties will
understand that neutrals who are court employees have no incentive to prolong
mediation sessions in order to increase their compensation-a concern that
could undermine confidence in the mediator's motives when the parties are
required to pay market rates.
Moreover, if the neutrals are full-time employees of the court, and if they
are prohibited from having a private mediation practice, there will be no
occasion to worry that what is driving their service is an effort to build up a
lucrative private practice. By contrast, if the neutrals are not employees of the
court, and if they have a private mediation practice, or an interest in
developing such a practice, parties might worry about whether the neutrals
have agreed to serve in the court's program primarily in order to "use" it (and
whatever resum6 value it may entail) to enhance their ability to attract more
lucrative work in the private sector.
Ironically, this concern might be greatest in programs in which the
neutrals serve in the court's program either for free or at substantially reduced
rates. Similarly, there is a greater risk in programs in which the neutrals serve
for free or for relatively little compensation that the parties will worry that the
neutrals are not devoting their full resources (e.g., intellectual or time) to the
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work-and therefore that the neutrals' contributions in the ADR process are
likely to be superficial and unreliable.
Using full-time employees of the court to provide the ADR services also
eliminates another, less likely source of concern about the motives of the
neutrals. When the neutrals have active private law practices, some litigants
might worry that the primary reason the lawyers are serving in the court's
ADR program is to curry favor with the judges-favor that those lawyers
might hope would yield advantages when they appear before the court as
representatives of clients in other cases.
The staff-employee model also eliminates the possibility of another,
related problem. In models that draw on service by lawyers who have private
practices, and in which the court plays a role in determining which lawyers
are sent the mediation work, there is a risk that the court could be perceived
as establishing a clique of favorite lawyers-lawyers in whom the court has a
special level of confidence and to whom the court is in some sense
"beholden." The rest of the bar might worry that these "anointed" lawyers
enjoy unfair advantages when they appear in a court (in other cases) that has
publicly expressed its confidence in them by appointing them to a panel of
neutrals and sending work to them.47
A different fairness concern could arise if a lawyer who served the court
as a full-time staff mediator resigned and then began appearing in adversary
proceedings in that court. Individual courts will need to determine whether
there is sufficient risk in this scenario to justify prophylactic rules. One
obvious possibility (inspired by restrictions on appearances by former law
clerks before the judges they served) would be to preclude a former full-time
mediator from representing clients in the court that employed the mediator for
some period after the mediator left the court's employ. If such a restriction
were imposed, it is not clear how much harm it would do to the court's ability
to recruit top-flight lawyers to serve as full-time mediators.
47 Courts that draw on the services of private practitioners can reduce this potential
problem by having some outside group or institution select the neutrals for the court's panel
and assign the cases to the neutrals. For example, a local bar association might perform this
function, or some other (more broadly based) public or nonprofit agency. Courts also can
avoid this problem if they play no role in the process by which parties enlist the services
of a neutral-opting, instead, just to send the parties into the private sector. But all these
kinds of "solutions" undermine or eliminate the court's ability to maintain quality control.
These solutions also dilute the public's sense that the program really is the court's-and
really enjoys the court's fill confidence. The more remote the neutrals are from the court,
the greater the dilution of the court's imprimatur and, with that, the dilution of the public's
presumptive trust in the ADR process.
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Litigants who fear that a neutral is serving in order to curry favor with the
court also might fear that the neutral will pressure them to settle (to please the
judges even more) or will leak mediation confidences to the assigned judge
(e.g., to encourage that judge to feel that the neutral has helped tte judge
identify the pressure points in the litigation). However, fear that the neutral
might pressure the parties to settle, in order to please the judges, or might leak
confidential information to the judges, also can arise in the staff-neutral
model. In fact, I would guess that these kinds of fears would be greater under
the staff-neutral model than under the others-because in that model the
neutrals have the most to fear if the judges are displeased with their work,48
and because in that model the neutrals are physically and institutionally closer
to the judges than in any other model-so the temptations and opportunities for
unauthorized communication are greatest.49 All other things being equal (they
never are), concern that the neutrals might feel pressure to push parties to
settle, and concern that the neutrals might leak confidences to judges, would
seem least likely to arise when the neutrals are most remote from the court-.
either shielded by another organization that orchestrates the provision of their
services or selected by the parties on their own in the private market. As
emphasized in other sections, however, "remoteness" between the neutrals
and the court creates a host of other problems-some of considerable potential
magnitude.
We shift focus here slightly to ask directly whether ADR neutrals are
likely to enjoy more presumptive respect (from the public) under some of the
models than under others. Are participants in the ADR program likely to vest,
at the outset, a mediator who is a full-time employee of the court with more
status or respect than a mediator who is not on the court's staff.? If the services
of the mediator are provided through some other institution with which the
court has a contract, does the level of respect for or confidence in that
institution inure to the benefit (or detriment) of the mediator?
The answers to these questions are not obvious and could vary with the
circumstances. Generally, I would guess that the closer the connection
between the court and the neutral, the greater the presumptive respect the
48 This kind of concern suggests the advisability of exploring ways, under the staff-
neutral system, to separate at least most of the judges in any given court from decisions
about hiring and firing the neutrals. It might be wise, for example, to explore the pros and
cons of having the neutrals hired and disciplined by a court's top administrative officer, or,
perhaps preferably, by a regional or state-wide body (composed, perhaps, of judges,
administrators, lawyers, and other members of the public)-a group drawn from a much
wider area than the area served by the court in which the staff-neutral is employed.
49 See Pruett, supra note 8, at 15.
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neutral is likely to enjoy. There certainly is more of a mantling effect when
a court has made the neutral its full-time employee, has brought the person
directly inside the judicial institution on a full-time basis, and, thereby, seems
to directly "vouch" for the neutral's integrity and ability. On the other hand,
as just noted, parties may be more likely to worry that a mediator who is
employed by the court might permit pressure to get the cases settled to distort
his or her behavior (e.g., that such pressure might compromise the honesty
and reliability of the mediator's analytical feedback) than a mediator who is
not dependent on the court for any significant portion of his or her income.
Moreover, considerable presumptive respect also could accompany
neutrals whose services are directly provided by some other nonprofit
organization-if that organization enjoys a clearly positive reputation within
at least the subset of the community from which most of the parties who will
participate in the ADR program will come. On the other hand, if the outside
organization is not well known, the neutrals' connection with it is not likely
to inspire any special level of trust or respect-and might even engender some
concerns (because the organization is an "unknown"). Of course, if the
outside organization is controversial (e.g., identified with one end of the
political spectrum or with a policy agenda that is not shared by some
appreciable portion of the community), the neutrals that organization provides
are likely to be saddled with negative presumptions, or at least suspicions,
about their underlying motives, their capacity to be impartial, or their
competence.
Courts that consider having an outside organization provide ADR
services, or arrange for work by neutrals, also should be sensitive to the
possibility that parties might worry that institutional self-interest might infect
the provision of service by the organization or the way its neutrals perform
their tasks. Suspicions can arise even about the motives of "nonprofit"
organizations. Such organizations have staff-and parties might fear that the
staff's decisions could be affected by their presumed interest in their salaries
and expense accounts. Moreover, the world of nonprofit ADR providers is not
immune from competition and from the temptations of empire building.
Parties are likely to assume that even nonprofit organizations want to survive
and prosper-and that assumption might cause parties to fear that
institutionally selfish motives could infect the delivery of ADR services.
Presumptions of respect also could be affected by what the public knows
about the level of compensation the neutrals receive for their work-a matter
we address in a subsequent section. We simply note here that any presumption
of respect that mediators who are employed by the court might enjoy could be
diluted if users of the system understood that the compensation the staff
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mediators receive is appreciably lower than the compensation that quality
professionals earn in the private sector.
D. Messages About the Role of Courts in Our Society and About the
Relation Between the Public and the Private Sectors in the Provision
of ADR Services
We consider next what messages the adoption of the different models
might send to the public about the role of the courts in our society and about
the relation between the public and the private sectors with respect to the
provision of ADR services.
The model in which full-time employees of the court directly provide the
ADR services affirms most clearly the view that the courts have a broad
responsibility to help people resolve their disputes. More than any of the
others, this model signals the courts' commitment to the notion that if
processes other than traditional litigation best serve the dispute resolution
needs of some substantial number of cases, the courts have a responsibility to
employ or offer those processes. In sharp contrast, the model that sends this
message least clearly is the model under which courts send parties into the
private market and require them to pay the fees of the private neutrals.
Significantly, the staff-neutral model also most clearly signals society's
direct encouragement of constructive approaches to communication and
problem solving, and it represents an unequivocal endorsement of the
fundamental notion that there is a real societal good in resolving disputes
consensually. A court that directly involves itself only in traditional adversary
litigation could be perceived as making a value judgment about approaches to
problem solving-as implying that the most important and most highly valued
procedures for resolving disputes are those that are essentially combative and
competitive. In sharp contrast, a court that visibly commits its own money and
its own staff resources directly to a mediation program very clearly puts its
imprimatur on the notion that traditional adversarial litigation is not always the
most appropriate or the most effective way to address problems-and that
there can be real value in a process that requires substantial cooperation and
in which the communication is more direct, more open, and more sympathetic
than it often is in traditional litigation.
A more complicated picture emerges when we consider what messages the
different models send about what the relationship should be between public
and private provision of ADR services. On the one hand, by endorsing ADR
so clearly, the court that adopts the staff-neutral model affirms the importance
of the notion that it is good for private parties to retain power to fix the terms
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of the disposition of their disputes-rather than to relinquish that power to a
judge or jury. In this way, a court that adopts the staff-neutral model
encourages parties to accept greater responsibility for what happens to them-
and signals that the private, consensual resolution of problems is, generally,
a social good.
On the other hand, if the only ADR services that the court clearly
sanctions are services provided by its employees, the public might infer that
the court either believes that the courts should fully occupy the ADR field or
that there is some reason to lack confidence in ADR services provided by the
private sector. The pure staff-neutral model incorporates no symbolic
acknowledgment of the possibility that what is best for our society is to have
vigorous contributions simultaneously from both the private and the public
sector, and that what is best for ADR is to have an ongoing, cooperative,
dialectical relationship between the private and public sectors, each teaching
and enriching the other, and each meeting needs the other cannot. The model
that would best send these messages would be a hybrid: some provision of
ADR services by staff-neutrals, some by neutrals from the private sector-the
latter with the court's imprimatur, if not its active involvement.
VI. COMPARING THE MODELS: FAIRNESS
A. Democratization of Access
Democratization of access to mediation services can be an important
element in public perception of the fairness of a court-connected program. The
model in which professionals on the court's staff directly provide the
mediation services appears to interpose the fewest economic, procedural, and
sociological barriers to participation. The mediation service is free-so no
party is frozen out because it cannot pay. The procedural path of access is
most straightforward-it can be traversed within the same floor of the same
building in many instances. And, unlike referrals to a private organization or
private mediator, there is less occasion to fear the unknown, to feel
intimidated, or to worry that the process will be unfair-after all, the service
is being directly provided by the same public institution whose charge is to
assure process fairness and to protect the weak against unfair procedural
advantages that the strong might otherwise enjoy.
There are two potentially very important dimensions of "access
democratization," however, in which this model can be much less attractive
than some of the others. Because public money to support court programs is
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limited, a court that adopts this model will probably be able to hire only a
small number of professional mediators. Unless the case population that the
court's program targets is narrowly defined, it is quite likely that the demand
for mediation services will exceed, at least in metropolitan settings, the supply
of staff mediators. Other models, especially those that rely largely on unpaid
volunteers or that send parties into the private sector to find (and pay) their
own neutral, can provide services to much larger numbers of cases. This can
be a very significant factor for courts that want to offer mediation services to
large numbers of cases and that believe they can achieve appropriate levels of
quality control even when their panels or rosters of neutrals are very large and
include some people who are involved in ADR sessions only occasionally. 50
Moreover, courts that adopt models that involve large pools of neutrals
also can achieve much greater diversity (of professional background, expertise
and perspective, as well as gender, race or national origin, and sexual
orientation) within the group that provides the ADR services than courts that
rely on small staffs of employee neutrals. In ways we explore in the next
section, diversity within the panel of neutrals could affect public confidence
in the fairness of the court-sponsored ADR program.
There is one additional dimension of the "democratization" perspective
that warrants mention at this juncture. This dimension would only indirectly
affect public feelings about the fairness of an ADR program, but I point to it
now because of its dependence on the size of the pool of neutrals in a court's
program and where those neutrals are drawn from. Models that train and use
large numbers of neutrals from the private sector would appear to be much
more effective than the other models at spreading the culture of ADR. When
larger and more diverse groups of people are trained as neutrals, the
constructive spirit and the process ideas that inform ADR can reach faster and
farther into our society-and into a range of sectors that is much broader than
it would be under models that rely on smaller and less diverse pools of
neutrals. Some program designers believe that training in ADR (especially
mediation) affects how neutrals behave not only when they are serving the
court, but also when they practice law or conduct the other affairs of their
lives-thus spreading less adversarial and less rigid modes of interaction into
many different parts of the social fabric.
These are pluses for people who believe in ADR-but they also can have
fairness benefits for court programs. The better the understanding and the
wider the knowledge of ADR processes, the more court programs are likely
50 We discuss barriers (administrative and economic) to quality control under non-
staff-neutral models in Part VII, infra.
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to be accurately understood and appropriately utilized. These developments
can lead to less abuse of ADR processes and fewer frustrated ADR
expectations-which, in turn, yield fewer occasions for parties to feel that
their participation in an ADR proceeding ended up being unfair.
B. Expectations About the Neutral's Role in Assuring Fairness and
Impact of Choice of Model on Those Expectations
Generally, we would expect the parties' sense of the fairness of the ADR
process they experience to be affected at least in some measure by how closely
that process conforms to their expectations about the nature of that process-
especially expectations that the parties believe the court encouraged. If that is
so, one of the questions we should ask is whether the model the court adopts
could affect the parties' (as opposed, perhaps, to the lawyers') expectations
about the role the neutral will play in the ADR process. More specifically,
could the model itself encourage the parties (even if not their lawyers) to
develop expectations about how analytically active or evaluative the neutral
will be, or about the circumstances in which the neutral will intervene in the
process to make sure that it remains "fair" in some sense?
The answers to these questions could be affected by at least three major
variables. The first is the expectations the parties have about the role
(responsibility for fairness) of the court generally in civil litigation. The
second is the nature of the ADR process and the announced roles of the
neutral in it. And the third is the perceived closeness of the connection
between the court and its ADR neutrals.
Parties who believe that the court, as an institution of democratic
government, has considerable responsibility in civil litigation generally for
assuring fairness (both procedural and substantive) are more likely than others
to expect ADR neutrals to take proactive steps to assure fairness during ADR
proceedings. 51 But even if we limit our focus to lawyers and to procedural
fairness, we still encounter very divergent views. Adherents to the traditional
notions that allegedly informed the development of the adversary system could
be offended by judicial interference even to protect basic procedural rights.
Social Darwinists would expect the courts to remain very passive-to do
51 There probably is a wide range of expectations among parties and, to a lesser
degree, among lawyers, about the level of responsibility courts have for assuring fairness.
Sophisticated users of the court system will be careful to distinguish between procedural
fairness and substantive fairness-and presumably will expect a higher level of
responsibility in the courts for the former than for the latter.
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nothing more than to issue rulings in reaction to initiatives taken by counsel.
On the other end of the spectrum, aggressive proponents of managerial
judging would expect judges to take proactive roles (1) in fixing process rules
that assure fair access to evidence, (2) in identifying the issues, and even (3)
in helping steer the parties toward the most important evidence. Such
expectations would be intensified in ADR programs that expressly include an
evaluative or quasi-directive role for the neutral.
And these expectations could be intensified even further by the model the
court chooses for delivering its ADR services. Among all those models, the
one in which the parties are most likely to expect the role of their ADR
neutral to track the role the parties would expect a judge to play is the staff-
neutral model. In that model, the parties are most likely to assume that the
judges hired the neutrals, that the neutrals "work for" and in some sense
"report to" the judges, and that the neutrals are doing work that the judges
otherwise might be called upon to do. In sum, it is in the staff-neutral model
that the parties are likely to perceive the connection between the ADR neutrals
and the judges to be closest. And because of that closeness of connection, it
may well be that it is in the staff-neutral model that the parties are most likely
to expect the ADR neutrals to act like judges, or at least to assume a similar
level of responsibility for the faifness of the ADR process.
Thus, parties who believe that the court generally is responsible for
fairness in civil litigation may well expect staff-neutrals to take proactive steps
to assure fairness during ADR proceedings-regardless of what the court's
literature says about neutrals having limited responsibilities. In contrast, the
same parties might expect much less activist intervention by a neutral whom
they hired in the private market, a neutral whose connection with the court is
thin, at best.52
Stated differently, I suspect that whether the neutral is an employee of the
court could affect the parties' expectations about the role the neutral will play
and how the neutral would respond to various ethical dilemmas-even in
processes that are nominally the same (e.g., even in mediations governed by
the same rules). 53 Because I suspect that most people feel that the courts
52 The model in which the court simply sends the parties into the private sector to find
and pay for their own neutral seems closest to Social Darwinism-and thus least likely to
engender expectations that the neutral will actively interfere with whatever course the
mediation seems "naturally" inclined to take.
53 This clearly is an arena in which we need empirical studies. We need to know
whether the fact that the neutral is an employee of the court has any effect on the
expectations of the parties (or their lawyers) about the roles the neutral will play (in
processes that are nominally the same, e.g., mediation) and about how the neutrals might
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should be responsible for assuring the fairness of what happens in judicial
proceedings, I believe that parties are more likely to expect a neutral who is
a court employee (than a neutral who works primarily in the private sector)
to be sure that every party has all the information it needs and that the
information the parties have at least about the law is accurate; 54 to assure that
a stronger party does not take unfair advantage of a weaker party; and not to
permit the parties to execute an agreement that is unenforceable, unlawful, or
substantially out of line with the real settlement value of the case.
If an institution outside the court orchestrates the provision of the ADR
services, the parties' expectations about the role the neutral will play could be
affected by the reputation of that institution-and the values it is believed to
stand for or the interests it is publicly committed to advancing. For example,
if mediation services in a family law court are provided by an institution that
is committed to protecting the best interests of children, parties might expect
the neutrals to develop specific ideas in particular cases about what those best
interests are, then to guide or push the parties in that direction.
Because parties are not likely to respect a program if the neutrals'
behavior deviates substantially from the parties' expectations, each court
should consider whether its choice of model will affect those expectations-
and should take active steps to assure that they are in line with the role the
court actually wants its neutrals to play. A court that wants its neutrals to play
a very passive role should think twice before adopting the staff-neutral
model. 55
respond to specific ethical dilemmas. Researchers should try to determine, for example,
whether parties are more likely to expect a neutral who is a court employee than a neutral
from the private sector to take steps to compensate for imbalances in power between the
parties (and whether it matters what the nature of the imbalances are-for example,
analytical, emotional, or economic). Are the litigants more likely to expect a neutral who
is a court employee to protect a party from entering an agreement that is "unfair"? Are the
parties more likely to expect a neutral who is a court employee to tell the parties about case
law or statutes that they are not citing but that could play an important role in determining
what their rights and obligations are?
54 More specifically, I suspect that parties are more likely to expect a staff-neutral
than a non-staff-neutral to tell them about case law or statutes that the parties do not appear
to be aware of but that could significantly affect their rights and obligations.
55 At a minimum, a court that adopts the staff-neutral model but that wants its
mediators to play a very passive role should actively educate the parties about the limits it
imposes on the conduct of its mediators.
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C. Risk of Process Distortion from Parties Equating ADR Neutrals with
Judges
These observations lead us to a related and potentially significant question.
Is there a relationship between the apparent closeness of the connection
between the ADR neutral and the court, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the level of risk that parties will look for suggestions or directives from the
neutral or feel pressure (unintended) to move in directions they believe the
neutral wants? This question arises from the possibility that the closer the
perceived connection is between the ADR neutral and the court, the greater
the risk is that the parties (perhaps subconsciously) will equate the neutral with
the court. In other words, the tighter the connection the greater the risk that
the parties will assume that the neutral is the court-and then react to the
neutral as they would react to the court itself.
I do not know how likely this kind of equation of neutral with judge is,
but if it occurs, it could have serious negative repercussions. It could incline
some parties toward greater procedural formality and caution, and could lead
them to play their interest and informational cards very close to the vest. More
dangerous, a party's subconscious identification of the neutral with the judge
could increase the risk that the party would perceive pressure where none was
being applied, or that the party's decisions would be distorted by fear of
displeasing the neutral or by some misplaced sense of responsibility to do what
the neutral wanted them to do.
Equating the neutral with the court, or a judge, also could inspire (again
subconsciously) excessive deference. It could lead parties to invest the neutral
with greater wisdom and a more important role than the neutral really has.
That, in turn, could lead parties to be too concerned about what the neutral
thought, and to spend too much time looking for clues or guidance from the
neutral about what to do. All of these behaviors and concerns would distort
the parties' participation in the ADR event-thus compromising it
philosophically and undermining its value to the litigants.
The risk that parties would mistakenly equate the neutral with the court,
and that that equation would distort their participation in the ADR process
probably varies with a number of factors in addition to the perceived closeness
of connection between the ADR neutral and the court. The level of this risk
will depend in part, of course, on the level of the parties' sophistication about
the legal system and about ADR. There is little risk, for example, that
institutional litigants who are repeat users of the system will slip into this
misunderstanding. The magnitude of this risk also could vary with the kind of
case, the stage in the proceedings, and the role the neutral plays-the more the
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neutral performs functions that look like functions the court performs (e.g.,
case management and evaluation) the greater the risk of equation. Among all
factors, however, the single most important probably will be whether the
parties are represented by counsel.
D. Confidence in the Neutrality of the Neutrals
The public's confidence that any given ADR program is fair depends
vitally on the perception that the people who serve as the neutrals really are
neutral, free of any kind of bias or predisposition. Comparing the models with
respect to the many different factors that can affect party confidence in the
impartiality of the neutral is a complicated undertaking, and not all factors
point to the superiority of any one model. On balance, however, I am inclined
to the view that the staff-neutral model is likely to deliver the most confidence
in the impartiality of the neutrals. The thoughts that support this view follow.
First, I would expect that once a professional becomes an employee of the
court and works full time as an agent of the court, that professional would
enjoy the presumption of neutrality with which the people generally greet
judges-virtually all of whom formerly were lawyers, and most of whom
could have been identified, when they were lawyers, with one side or another
or with one institutional leaning. But once they become judges, most of the
time they probably are presumed to be neutral-as able for all essential
purposes to set aside their background and to face each case and litigant with
a fresh, open-minded perspective. I would expect professionals who become
full-time members of the court's staff to be viewed similarly.
Parties may be appreciably less likely to vest private sector neutrals with
this presumption of neutrality. 56 If the likelihood of the vesting of this
presumption varies with the perceived distance between the private mediator
and the court, a court that wants its privately employed neutrals to enjoy this
presumption would be required to take active steps to publicize its connection
with and endorsement of the neutral. But undertaking such affirmative steps
can be burdensome and dangerous. For starters, courts should be very careful
56 This is another assumption that should be tested empirically. It is possible that
perceived tightness of connection between the mediator and the court has virtually no
bearing on the likelihood that the mediator will be presumed to be impartial (so that
everyone who serves with the court's blessing, regardless of how remotely conferred, is
greeted with substantially the same set of assumptions about neutrality)-or that other
factors play much more important roles in determining whether a mediator is likely to be
perceived as neutral.
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to assure themselves that a mediator really is good and ethical before
endorsing that person. That kind of assurance can be achieved in different
ways, but most of them are expensive-e.g., by providing or paying for
extensive (and graded) training for the neutrals or by conducting labor-
intensive research into their backgrounds and experience, interviewing them,
and observing them perform as a mediator (which can require very different
skills than performing well as a litigator).
Moreover, as noted above, a court that actively endorses some neutrals
can create the impression that those neutrals (a small sub-group within a
professional community) enjoy a special level of confidence by the court-
giving those professionals a resented leg up in the marketplace and in the
courtroom.
Aside from these kinds of difficulties, when the neutrals are persons who
work primarily in the private sector there are many more occasions for
concern about their impartiality. Bias (actual or perceived) could infect
neutrals through the source of funds used to compensate them, the ties they
retain while they are on the court's roster of neutrals, and the other work or
activities in which they engage while they are serving in the court's program.
For example, parties might wonder whether a mediator with a private ADR
practice might tend to favor a major institutional player that might serve as a
source of repeat business for that mediator in her private practice. More
commonly, a party could have serious questions about the neutrality of
mediators who have active law practices in which they spend disproportionate
percentages of their time either on the plaintiffs' side or on the defense side.
A plaintiff might worry that a lawyer who usually represents corporate
defendants, for example, would have so absorbed one perspective that she is
not capable of bringing a truly open mind to a mediation assignment. 57
Moreover, courts that use an outside organization or institution to provide
mediators, or to facilitate the provision of ADR services, add another player
to the mix-and thereby increase the risk that fear of bias, or perception of
bias, will compromise parties' confidence in the impartiality of the neutrals.
As noted earlier, fear can be spawned simply by ignorance-and if parties are
not familiar with the organization that provides the mediators, they may be
fearful that that organization is driven by an agenda that is inconsistent with
impartiality. An even more difficult situation arises if parties think they know
57 Some parties also might worry that a mediator whose private practice is
disproportionately on one side (plaintiffs or defendants) will overcompensate in an effort
to achieve fairness or the appearance of fairness-and end up being more demanding of the
side she usually represents.
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the outside organization and identify it with controversial, or not universally
shared, political or social views. A court that "partners" with an outside
organization imports any reputation baggage that organization carries. Even
publicly supported, community based, nonprofit organizations can be
burdened with such baggage and thus can trigger fears in some litigants.
Parties with strong conservative political views, for example, might assume
that a community-based nonprofit organization is dominated by persons with
left of center politics, persons who are motivated by a desire to promote the
interests of the working class, minorities, and women. Fear of agendas like
these could compromise confidence in the impartiality of neutrals who are
provided by organizations other than courts.
None of these issues is likely to surface in a court that uses only staff
(court-employee) neutrals and that requires its neutrals to sever other
professional ties and to forsake other employment, as well as other activities
that could call the neutrals' impartiality into question. In short, the incidence
of perceived conflicts of interest is likely to be lowest in the staff-neutral
model.
The incidence of actual conflicts of interest also is likely to be lowest in
this model-because it provides the court with the tightest control over the
selection, training, and monitoring of its neutrals-and thus with the best
ability to screen out biases and conduct that suggests bias.
While courts who use mediators from the private sector can develop
conflict of interest and disclosure rules that respond in part to concerns like
these, it is likely that no amount of regulation of such matters will completely
dispel generic fears with these kinds of sources. Furthermore, as we discuss
in a subsequent section, developing and administering conflicts regulations for
large numbers of neutrals drawn from the private sector can be very labor-
intensive.5 8 It also can pull the court into no-win situations-where a ruling
58 One dimension of this burden that my court did not filly anticipate involves trying
to set up rules that give neutrals clear guidance about what limits their service as a mediator
in the court's program imposes on the work they can accept in the flaure. For example, we
have been asked for guidance about whether a neutral is forever barred from representing
a client that was a party to a mediation which the neutral hosted. Or whether the law firm
in which the neutral works is so barred. If the answer to these questions turns, at least in
part, on whether there is a connection between the subject matter of the mediation and the
subject matter involved in the later representation, the court may be asked to promulgate
guidelines or to resolve close questions about what constitutes a barring connection. If these
rules are too demanding, neutrals will be discouraged from serving, but if the rules are not
demanding enough, the public might lose confidence that the neutrals are serving without
conflict of interest. For a thoughtful discussion of these kinds of problems, and suggestions
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will leave either a neutral feeling insulted or a party feeling unfairly
jeopardized. Using staff-neutrals enables a court to avoid virtually all of these
kinds of problems.
While detecting biased or otherwise inappropriate behavior is likely to be
appreciably easier in the staff-neutral model, it is not as clear that this model
offers the most effective setting for disciplining neutrals who breach duties or
do not perform well. The staff-neutral model offers clear advantages when the
appropriate discipline is relatively mild or when the only thing the neutral
needs is some additional education. If what is needed is counseling, a
reprimand, or, perhaps, a modest benefit loss, there is much to commend the
staff model. These kinds of discipline can be imposed relatively easily and
their effectiveness can be assessed more reliably than under other models.
But the legal and sociological obstacles to imposing more severe forms of
discipline can be appreciably higher under the staff-neutral model than under
all the others. In many settings, it will be very difficult and may be very
expensive to terminate, suspend, or reassign a staff mediator.59 In addition to
potentially formidable procedural and substantive barriers to such action, a
court is likely to resist coming to the conclusion that it made a serious error
when it made the decision to hire the person serving in its program-so the
court's ability to be objective in reviewing the neutral's performance and the
court's willingness to take appropriate corrective action could be
compromised.
about which sources of norms offer the best guidance for addressing these kinds of issues,
see generally Poly Software Int'l, Inc. v. Datamost Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah
1995).
59 Because of the potential difficulty of firing someone who is not performing well,
courts that adopt this model might consider a couple of steps they could take to reduce the
likelihood that they would get stuck with a staff mediator who performs poorly or who
otherwise behaves in ways that do not reflect well on the court. One possible step is to
establish clear periods of probation for all newly hired staff-neutrals (e.g., for six months
or a year). As Robert Rack (Chief Mediator for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit) has pointed out, however, a system like this could make it difficult to attract
high quality people to these positions-especially in urban areas where the salaries may not
be fully competitive with the private sector.
Another way to respond to this kind of problem, also suggested by Mr. Rack, would
be to make appointments to these positions for fixed terms, either renewable at the
discretion of the court or not renewable at all. A nonrenewable term also probably would
hurt the capacity to recruit talented neutrals-especially if the term were only a few years.
Courts also need to attend to the length of the professional learning curve for staff-
neutrals. The longer the angle of that curve remains steep (upward), the longer a fixed term
for the staff-neutrals' employment would need to be.
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The barriers to removing a neutral from a large panel, by contrast, can be
appreciably lower-especially if the neutrals are serving as volunteers or rely
on referrals from the court's program for only a small percentage of their
income. 60 Moreover, a court has much less of its ego invested in people who
serve in large pools of neutrals and who mediate court-referred cases only on
a very part-time basis with little or no pay.
Another vantage point from which to think about perceptions of bias in
court-sponsored ADR programs focuses on the composition of the pool of
people who make up the corps of neutrals. How important the specific
character of the profile of that pool is could depend on a number of variables,
not least of which would be the kinds of cases and clients whom the court
wants to serve. But at least in some settings, it can be important (to the goal
of encouraging a feeling that the neutrals are not biased) to have a pool of
mediators either (1) that reflects a wide and representative range of
backgrounds and perspectives or (2) that assures litigants in focused classes
of cases that their neutrals will be people whose experience equips them to
understand and appreciate the unique circumstances faced by a particular
segment of the population.
We explore first the relationship between public confidence in the
impartiality of the neutrals and diversity in the panel. Under each of the
models, of course, there is some risk that the public will feel that the neutrals
are drawn exclusively, or predominantly, from groups with affinities for
particular interests or kinds of clients-so every court, regardless of the model
it adopts, must be sure that its pool of neutrals does not reflect
disproportionately the views of only one part -of the client base that the
program will serve. But the challenge of developing a panel of neutrals that
is perceived to be broadly diverse and "representative" obviously is greatest
when the panel is smallest-and the panels are likely to be smallest under the
staff-neutral model. Developing a panel of neutrals that is richly diverse will
be much more feasible in the models in which the court pays persons from the
private sector to serve or orchestrates service by volunteers.
Moreover, in some programs, some of the kinds of people the court will
want to serve as neutrals will not be able or willing to work full-time as court
employees-they will have other commitments that they will not be willing to
60 While the likelihood that a member of a court's panel of neutrals would sue if
removed from the panel seems small, as does the likelihood that such a suit would survive
a motion to dismiss, it has been rumored that at least one such suit has been filed against
a state court program.
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sacrifice, or they will have salary requirements the court could not meet.61
Such people might be willing to serve-but only if they could do so on a
limited, very part-time basis. Stated differently, in some situations courts
simply will not be able to hire as ful-time employees the kinds of people who
will bring to the ADR table the backgrounds that will be necessary to inspire
all groups of parties to believe that they are being heard and understood.
Parties who believe they are not being heard and understood are more likely
to feel that their neutral is biased.
So when designing their programs, each court or court system should
identify the universe of cases it wants to serve and then make judgments about
(1) how important diversity in the panel of neutrals will be to the litigants in
that universe, 62 (2) what the specific character of the appropriate diversity will
consist of, and (3) how many neutrals the panel would need to include in order
to achieve that kind of diversity.
In making these kinds of judgments, courts will understand, of course,
that the individual ADR sessions will not be hosted by the whole panel of
neutrals, but, usually, by one human being. 63 The background of that one
human being will not parallel in composite the breadth and diversity of
backgrounds in the entire pool-and in some cases, at least, one or more of
the parties is likely to feel that the background of the individual human being
who serves as the neutral in their case does not match up well with their own
61 Examples might include people who have active civil rights practices or who work
for public or nonprofit agencies that focus all their resources on addressing particular kinds
of problems in which the neutrals have an abiding interest. Another example might consist
of very highly paid intellectual property lawyers-who are not willing to give up their
private sector income in order to work full time for the court, but who are willing, as a
matter of public service, to mediate a few cases a year.
62 The importance of breadth or diversity of background in the profile of the court's
neutrals, or that the neutrals bring particular kinds of experience to their work, also can
depend, in part, on the role the court asks the neutrals to play. Generally, the more
analytically active or evaluative the court wants the neutrals to be, the greater the need for
neutrals with backgrounds that the parties believe equip the neutrals to understand the
parties' circumstances and the issues that arise in their kind of case.
63 Some ADR programs may permit or provide for service by more than one neutral
in one ADR session. For example, some programs might provide for a lawyer and an
accountant to serve simultaneously as comediators, or, more generally, for comediations
by two-person teams made up of a person with especially strong process skills and another
person with especially deep subject matter expertise. And for cases of unusual sensitivity,
some programs might provide for service by a politically or sociologically balanced team
of three neutrals. But most court-sponsored programs will likely be constrained to rely in
most cases on the service of a single neutral.
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background. This inevitability, however, does not mean that diversity and
breadth of background in the pool of neutrals is unimportant. Macro-level
confidence in the balance and breadth of the pool can be very important, by
itself, to the public's embrace of a program as fundamentally fair. And
individual litigants probably are less likely to worry about bias in individual
neutrals if those individual neutrals are part of a larger pool that is known to
be well balanced and in some relevant sense representative. 64 Moreover, a
court whose pool of neutrals includes broad ranges of backgrounds is
appreciably better situated than a court with a narrow pool to find in any given
case a neutral who enjoys the confidence of both sides (either because both
parties share one kind of background or because the court can find a neutral
whose background includes something important to each party).
If, after taking all these matters into account, a court concludes that the
profile of the panel of neutrals would significantly effect the pertinent
public's 65 confidence in the fairness of the program, and if the needed profile
cannot be achieved through a staff of full-time court employees, the court will
be forced to make difficult judgments about the relative importance of the
other benefits that the staff model delivers-and will need either to choose a
different model or to establish a panel of neutrals from the private sector to
supplement (perhaps only for a defined group of cases) the services the staff-
neutrals provide.
64 Ironically, a pool of neutrals that includes people from the far ends of relevant
perspective or experience spectrums might increase the likelihood that a party to an ADR
session would identify the neutral assigned to her case with an extreme point of view-and
assume that the assigned neutral would be biased in favor of certain kinds of parties. Courts
that build pools of neutrals that include persons visibly on one end of any pertinent
spectrum should take special steps to reassure the public about the absence of bias in the
people who serve and to teach their neutrals how to dispel fears about partiality.
65 By "pertinent public" I mean, at a minimum, the segment of the public that is to be
served by the particular ADR program.
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E. Fear of "Leaks" and of Retribution for "ADR Failure"
The rules that govern many ADR programs promise the participants that
the content of their discussions during a mediation56 will remain confidential
and that the mediator will not divulge the parties' secrets to the assigned
judge, or tell him or her anything about the positions the parties took during
the mediation. In programs that make these kinds of promises, parties would
justifiably feel that breaches of these promises, especially in the form of secret
communications from the mediator to the judge, would be unfair.
Is the risk of this kind of perceived unfairness any greater or any smaller
under the in-house model (where the mediations are hosted by professionals
employed full time by the court) than under other models? Probably. It would
at least appear to outsiders that there is more opportunity for contact between
the mediators and the judges when they all work in the same institution
(perhaps in the same building) all the time. And litigants might assume that the
temptation to engage in proscribed communications would be greater in this
setting. They might suspect that the judges would be less reluctant to call a
court employee about a case than an outside mediator, and, compared to
outsiders, staff mediators might have greater incentives to try to please the
judges for whom they work, or to help them better understand and manage
their cases.
Fears about these kinds of temptations and incentives might make
participants in the mediation program worry more about the reality of
confidentiality when the mediator is a full-time employee of the court. And
there is some anecdotal evidence from Ohio67 that suggests that the risk of
inappropriate disclosures to the judges is in fact greater when the neutrals are
court employees than when they are not, but this is another arena in which we
need considerably more empirical research (both about the actual risk of
inappropriate communications and about levels of concern in parties about
such communication).
We also should ask whether different models create different levels of risk
that parties will fear that the court will retaliate against them in some way if
66 1 focus on mediation in the text because the promise of confidentiality is likely to
be clearest when the ADR process used is mediation. For some other kinds of ADR
processes-e.g., nonbinding arbitration-there are likely to be much more limited promises
of confidentiality. In arbitrations under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 654-658 (West Supp. 1999), for
example, a party could make a record of statements made under oath during the arbitration
and might be able to use such statements for purposes of impeachment at a later trial.
67 See Pruett, supra note 8, at 15.
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their ADR session fails to produce a settlement. Such fears would be
compounded if the parties also were apprehensive that the neutrals might be
leaking information about the sessions to the judges-secret reports to the
judges that purported to identify the parties who were to "blame" for the
"failure" of the mediations would profoundly compromise a mediation
program (both philosophically and practically). The model that probably
would provide the highest level of reassurance to the parties about these
matters is the model in which the court contracts with an otherwise unrelated
nonprofit institution which, in turn, selects, trains, and deploys the mediators.
Under this model, unlike any of the others, there is an extra layer of
institutional insulation between the judges and the mediators-and little
apparent reason for the parties to worry that the neutrals might engage in
direct communications with the judges-such worries would be even less
likely if the court had not visibly spent a lot of its money on the ADR service
that the outside institution provided.
By contrast, fear about retaliation by the court for "ADR failures" 68 might
well be greatest when the neutrals are full-time employees of the court.
Ironically, one of the sources of this concern would be the same fact that
would support an inference that the courts that adopt the staff model are the
most committed to and supportive of ADR. Parties might fear that a court that
has sacrificed real resources of its own to support the ADR program is more
likely to be upset if the ADR sessions fail to produce settlements (or other
readily visible, practical benefits) than a court that appears to have committed
less to the ADR undertaking. Parties who are afraid that the judges or the
court administrators will be angry if their cases do not settle also may be
afraid that they will suffer some form of administrative or judicial
retribution-perhaps being sent to the end of the trial queue, or perhaps facing
a silently "adjusted" legal standard in a ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.
Given the several different kinds of fears and misperceptions I have
described in the preceding sections, courts that make strong and visible
commitments to their ADR programs, especially courts that opt for the staff-
neutral model, would be well advised to take special steps to reassure the
public that their neutrals will engage in no ex-parte communications with the
court, that the content of the parties' communications during the ADR
68 1 put this phrase in quotation marks to signal that it is a complete non sequitur to
suggest that there has been an "ADR failure" when an ADR session does not produce a
settlement. As I hope is obvious, much that is good and constructive can be achieved in
ADR sessions that yield no consensual disposition of the dispute.
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proceedings will not be disclosed to the judges, that the court knows that its
ADR program can be valuable and successful (under a wide range of
measures) even when cases do not settle, that neutrals who serve the parties
in the ADR setting are not judges and should not be equated with judges, and
that the court will take absolutely no adverse action against any litigant or case
in which no settlement is achieved in the ADR process.
VII. COMPARING THE MODELS: THE QUALITY OF THE NEUTRALs AND
OF THEIR ADR JOB PERFORMANCE
As I argued earlier, I believe that respect for and trust in an ADR
program, and confidence in its essential fairness and integrity, are likely to
depend more on the quality of the neutrals and the way they perform their
functions than on anything else. It is, therefore, especially important that we
try to determine whether some of the models are likely to deliver appreciably
higher quality neutrals and "neutraling" 69 than others. I hope that future
empirical research will include substantial exploration of this question. In the
absence of such research, however, we must try to identify factors that could
affect the quality of the delivered services under the different models.
Before turning to those factors, it is useful to restate the criteria that I
believe are essential70 to the definition of "high quality" service by an ADR
neutral in a court-sponsored program. At the center of every court's soul is
commitment to procedural fairness and to treating all parties equally under the
law. Because they work in court-sponsored programs, and will be viewed at
least in some measure as agents of a court, neutrals in these programs must
always behave in ways that are consistent with the core values for which the
courts stand. Thus, the neutrals in a court's program must (1) have deep moral
integrity and commitment to procedural fairness; (2) be scrupulously honest;
(3) be unwilling to resort to emotional or intellectual manipulation to achieve
ends; 71 (4) be respectful of others; (5) be able to listen to all parties with the
69 1 apologize for this subversion of established forms of our language. I use this
unconventional form only because it is so efficient.
70 As noted much earlier in this Essay, some of the criteria for defining "high quality"
service may vary with the purposes of the particular ADR program, with the character of
the role the neutrals are instructed to play, and with the kinds of cases, circumstances, and
parties the neutrals will serve. See discussion supra Part H.A.
71 This quality is very difficult for any human being to develop-but may prove
especially elusive for lawyers who spend most of their time working in the adversarial
culture of our traditional litigation system. That culture, at least as experienced in many
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same open and unbiased mind; (6) be capable of empathy and able to hear
emotionally subtle messages; (7) be able and willing to follow procedural
protocols; (8) be able to sustain, in trying circumstances, firm discipline over
intellect, emotion, and conduct-and to repress temptations to form opinions
prematurely; (9) be committed to service and able to project a strong desire
to help others; (10) bring sustainable energy and a positive spirit to the ADR
work; and (11) be able to comprehend new material quickly, to reason
reliably, and to assess accurately the limits of their own understanding,
intelligence, and powers of prediction.
A. Ability to Attract Neutrals Who Possess the Requisite Qualities
We begin this section by exploring the factors that could affect
significantly the courts' ability to attract high quality people to serve as
neutrals. How do the models compare in this important arena?
One factor that might be important is level of compensation. We do not
know as much as we need to about how much compensation the various
models72 could deliver to neutrals. We also know too little about how
variations in levels of compensation affect the capacity to attract and retain
neutrals, or the quality of the service the neutrals perform in individual cases.
These are arenas in which substantial empirical research could make a
valuable contribution.
Outside the major metropolitan areas, the compensation courts could offer
full-time mediators might not be substantially less than the compensation that
quarters, teaches, encourages, and rewards manipulative behavior. That fact might make
it especially difficult for people who are otherwise full-time litigators to identify (in
themselves) manipulative impulses and to forsake manipulative ways when they are serving
as an ADR neutral. For some kinds of mediation programs, these considerations may make
more attractive the models that do not use as neutrals lawyers who spend the bulk of their
time in traditional civil litigation.
72 The one obvious exception to this generalization arises in the model in which the
mediators are volunteers who serve for the most part without compensation, as a form of
public service. Neutrals who serve in programs operated under this model have extremely
limited opportunities for compensation. See N.D. CAL. ALTERNATVE Disp. RESOL. LOCAL
R. 5-4, 6-3 (1997). These rules require the evaluators in the early neutral evaluation
program and mediators in the mediation program to serve for no compensation through the
first four hours of the ADR session; thereafter, the neutrals may continue to serve without
pay (which is usually what happens), or the parties and the neutrals may agree to terminate
the process or to make arrangements under which the neutral would be compensated at a
rate of $150 per hour (at least through the next four hours of service).
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first rate lawyers or other professionals could earn in private practice. In the
metropolises, however, it is quite likely that courts will not be in a position to
offer staff mediators anywhere near the level of compensation that the best
lawyers or health care professionals can earn in the private sector. We simply
do not know how significant this fact is likely to be. If the neutrals in a given
program need not be lawyers, salary limitations may not be as substantial a
factor in recruiting. But even if most of the neutrals in a program are lawyers,
it does not necessarily follow that lower salaries would force the court to
accept less than fully competent neutrals.
For some very good professionals, money is by no means the controlling
factor in job selection. Good people are attracted to jobs in which they are
asked to spend their time trying to do good. And there can be many other
rewards in working directly and full time for the public. These include, among
others, freedom from pressure to bend one's values or distort one's conduct
in order to meet a client's objectives (objectives the lawyer might not respect)
or to "grow" a business, and freedom from the personal strains of private
practice (e.g., longer and less predictable hours, uncertainty about sources of
income, or the need to spend time generating new business and collecting old
accounts). We just do not know whether, for sufficient numbers of the kinds
of people the courts would want to serve as mediators, these kinds of offsets
can compensate adequately for the lower salaries that staff mediators are likely
to be offered in metropolitan jurisdictions.
My guess is that over time, as we increase our understanding of what it
means to be "good" as a neutral in a court-sponsored program, and as
experience working in neutral roles spreads in our communities, we are likely
to be able to attract large numbers of well-qualified applicants for staff-neutral
positions-despite salary obstacles. But to the extent that lower salaries impair
the courts' ability to recruit the highest quality people to serve, the staff-
neutral model may suffer in comparison to models in which neutrals are
selected from the private sector and serve at market rates on a case-by-case
basis or, ironically, models in which the neutrals are lawyers or other
professionals who are employed full time in the private sector and who serve
only occasionally, with little or no compensation, in a court's ADR program.
Closely related questions focus on the implications of particular models
for a court's ability to secure the services of neutrals with desired subject
matter expertise and breadth of experience. How important subject matter
expertise or experience in particular kinds of cases is to a program will depend
on a number of factors, including how analytically active the court wants its
neutrals to be and the range and kinds of cases served. A court that elects to
offer ADR services to a wide range of cases, and that wants its pool of
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neutrals to reflect a roughly parallel breadth of experience, is likely to find the
in-house model wanting. Under that model, budget constraints are likely to
limit the staff of neutrals to a relatively small number of professionals. A small
staff could not deliver subject matter expertise across a broad band of types
of cases. The much larger pools of neutrals that are often used under models
that rely on mediators who spend only small percentages of their time working
in the court's program offer much greater opportunities to develop truly
diverse panels.
On the other hand, subject matter expertise, or experience in particular
kinds of litigation, will be appreciably less important (perhaps not important
at all) to courts that embrace the purely facilitative model of mediation.
Facilitative mediators are expected to be experts in generic processes-and are
discouraged from offering evaluative inputs to the litigants. Courts that direct
their mediators to limit their role to facilitation will find the staff-neutral
model for delivering ADR services less limiting. These courts also may have
less difficulty recruiting from the private sector-because professionals who
offer only process skills and who do not use an evaluative approach in their
ADR work may not command the income in the private sector that can be
commanded by professionals who offer both subject matter expertise and an
assertively analytical approach to their work as neutrals.
We shift gears here to identify a separate, probably less consequential
consideration that also might affect a court's capacity to attract (and to retain)
high quality neutrals: the level of protection the neutrals feel from unjustified
lawsuits or disciplinary proceedings arising out of the way they carry out their
duties as neutrals. This is another arena in which we know too little. We do
not know how important it is to good neutrals to have a substantial amount of
protection from suits and disciplinary proceedings.
Some might argue (I do not think very persuasively) that the promise of
immunity (or other protections) would have a negative effect on the quality of
neutrals and their performance-in part on the theory that it is the people who
are not good at this work, or not morally disciplined, who seek these kinds of
protections, and that, once in place, the protections encourage a dangerous
moral or procedural laxity. It also is arguable that the people who are really
good at and committed to this kind of work will not care much about
protections of these kinds-because they will be confident that they do not
need them. I am not so sure. My experience suggests that if the neutrals are
lawyers who are serving as unpaid volunteers, or at below market rates of
compensation, they are likely to worry at least to some extent about immunity.
And if they are not full-time mediators (as most are not), they may worry
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about whether their insurance covers them when they are functioning in these
nonrepresentative capacities.
If we assume that reasonable access to a meaningful level of immunity
might contribute to the quality of the pool of neutrals, then using court staff
as the neutrals may well offer advantages. Staff-neutrals are probably less
likely to be sued, just because they are identified with the court, than neutrals
who are not court staff.73 And there may be less risk that courts would refuse
to grant immunity to court staff than to neutrals who are not employed or
otherwise paid by the court. While some state legislatures have adopted
immunity laws that confer substantial protections on private lawyers serving
as mediators, 74 there are a number of jurisdictions in which no legislation has
addressed this issue.75 And doctrine that would inform reasoning about the
availability of immunity is not well developed-so neutrals in jurisdictions
without legislation cannot proceed with great confidence.
The availability of immunity might turn, in some courts' views, on
whether or not the mediator is performing judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.76 But the criteria for identifying such functions are by no means
well developed. It is not clear, for example, that a mediator who is playing a
purely facilitative role, who is engaging in no analysis or evaluation, who is
making no decisions or recommendations (e.g., about case management,
discovery, or motion practice), and who has no power, would be viewed as
performing judicial functions (quasi or otherwise). The argument that the
mediator who is playing a purely facilitative role is performing judicial
73 On the other hand, if staff-neutrals handle a much larger number of cases than
neutrals under other models, there will be many more occasions for parties to be unhappy
with the staff-neutral.
74 See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-507 (West 1998); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4 § 18-13(3) (West Supp. 1998); R. Sup. CT. ARiz. 54(0; GA. ALTERNATvE
Disp. RESOL. R. VII.
75 In the first comprehensive federal legislation promoting ADR in the United States
district courts, for example, immunity is expressly conferred only on neutrals serving
formally as "arbitrators"-and there are relatively few substantial arbitration programs
under the authorizing legislation. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2996 (to be codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). In
particular, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 655(c) (West Supp. 1999), which expressly declares that
arbitrators are "performing quasi-judicial functions and are entitled to the immunities and
protections that the law accords to persons serving in such capacity." This statute says
nothing about whether neutrals serving in federal court programs as mediators or neutral
evaluators (or in any other ADR capacity) enjoy immunity from suit.
76 See, e.g., Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994), aff'g Wagshal v.
Foster, Civ. A. No. 92-2072, 1993 WL 86499 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1993).
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functions may face additional obstacles when the mediator is not a lawyer.
Fortunately, it is not clear that concern about immunity is deterring significant
numbers of good people from serving as neutrals in ADR programs, but the
fact that this issue would appear to provoke less concern when the neutrals are
full-time court employees is a modest factor in favor of choosing that model.
B. Capacity to Identify and Select High Quality Neutrals
There are significant differences between the models in the reliability of
the processes they employ for identifying and selecting people with the
requisite qualities to serve as neutrals. The most attractive model, measured
by these criteria, probably is the staff-neutral. Courts adopting this model can
exercise tight control over the selection process, after establishing clear and
demanding measures of suitability. Under this model, a court (or a group
serving as surrogate for or advisor to the court) will be called upon to hire
only a small number of people-so it will be feasible to use a more labor-
intensive and reliable selection process. That process can include background
checks, perhaps two stages of interviews (the first, briefer, to cut down a
larger group), and roll plays or observations. The hiring process also could
include a period of probation-during which the court could move or remove
candidates who failed to live up to the promise they appeared to have.
At the other end of this spectrum, the model that offers the least control
over the reliability of the process by which neutrals are selected is the model
in which the court sends the parties into the private sector to find their own
neutral. Stated differently, it is under this model that the risk is greatest that
people whom the court would not want representing it will end up serving.
This is true even if the court limits the universe of potential neutrals to a pool
that the court permits applicants to join only if they satisfy certain objective
criteria. Unless those criteria are detailed and demanding, 77 this model offers
much less control over selection of neutrals than the staff-neutral model.
Models that rely on occasional service by volunteers, or by people paid
at well below market rates, may offer somewhat more reliable selection
processes-especially if admission to the pool of neutrals is conditioned on
successful completion of a court-run or monitored training program that weeds
out unsuitable applicants, and if court staff who are familiar with the strengths
77 Such criteria might include, for example, successfully completing a specified,
lengthy, and high quality training program, as well as a certain number of monitored
(observed) mediation (or other neutraling) experiences.
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and weaknesses of the members of the pool play a role in connecting neutrals
with the specific cases in which they serve.
Generally, the larger the pool of people eligible to serve, the weaker the
selection control will be. And efforts to substantially tighten selection quality
control for larger groups are likely to be labor-intensive (therefore expensive).
The level of selection quality control under the model where the court
relies on an outside institution to identify, train, and provide the neutrals
obviously depends on the processes used by the outside institution.
C. Ability to Retain the Services over Time of People with the Best
Profile of Qualities
We turn next to questions about the courts' ability to retain the services
of the neutrals in their programs. The importance of being able to retain the
services of high quality neutrals will vary with the nature of the ADR program
(e.g., the complexity or subtlety of the circumstances in the mediated cases,
and how active or passive, socially and analytically, the mediators or other
neutrals are expected to be), with how much the court invests (by necessity or
election) in the training and skill development of the people who serve, with
how long it takes the neutrals to sophisticate their craft (which will vary,
again, with the character of the role to be played, as well as the kinds of cases
and clients to be served), and with how plentiful the supply of appropriately
qualified replacements is.
But the issue of retention will be of considerable moment to courts that
believe that (1) the skills of their neutrals are critical to their programs being
well respected and productive and that (2) developing refined neutraling skills
and sensitivities requires substantial training and experience. So at least some
courts are sure to conclude that it is important to retain the services of their
neutrals for substantial periods.
The model I will examine most carefully with respect to this "retention"
issue is the staff-neutral model. I focus in substantial measure on this model
because I have found that thinking reliably about it is the most challenging.
When I began addressing this question I felt that retention of high quality
people would be a serious problem under this model-a view that I am now
not sure is correct. For reasons I elaborate below, I am more optimistic about
the capacity for people to sustain (over a substantial period) high quality
service as staff-neutrals than I was when I started working on this Essay.78
78 Much of the development in my thinking about this issue is attributable to informal,
unstructured interviews with the following lawyers whose views I respect and who have
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Ability to retain the services of high quality neutrals under the staff-
neutral model is a complex matter and could depend on a large number of
variables, including the nature and purposes of the particular ADR program,
the kinds of cases served, the roles the neutrals are asked to play, the level of
pressure the neutrals feel to increase settlement rates or achieve other
objectively verifiable results, the volume of cases the staff-neutrals are
assigned, the mix of duties they are assigned, the degree of control or freedom
the neutrals enjoy over important (to them) aspects of their work, how much
intellectual and emotional nourishment is structured into the job, and salary
competition from the private sector.
I began my consideration of this issue by examining my experience as a
settlement judge,79 and the experience of other magistrate judges in my court
who devote considerable time to hosting settlement conferences. I am
persuaded now that generalizing from judges to staff-neutrals might not be
reliable, for reasons I will explain.. But I also believe that I have gained some
potentially useful insights through my work in this arena-and that courts who
are considering the staff-neutral model should take into account some of the
cautions that that experience suggests.
From personal experience, I have learned that work as a neutral in a
process designed to explore prospects for settling civil lawsuits is emotionally
and intellectually draining. A relentless diet of this kind of work can be
exhausting-at least for a judge. In fact, this kind of work takes more
sustained energy and attention, and is more emotionally taxing, than presiding
over jury trials. During jury trials, there are periods when the judge is clearly
not center stage-periods through which the judge can rest. But in a
mediation, the neutral must always be "on." A good neutral is always
working, always at least actively listening, always a significant participant in
the process dynamic.
And the work is not just with the neutral's mind. Emotion can play a big
role in mediations, and a mediator must acknowledge and work with emotion
in a way that judges presiding over trials or at hearings rarely are called upon
to do. Moreover, mediators work without the power of a judge and outside the
environment of discipline that the courtroom creates, so mediators must work
served for substantial periods as staff-neutrals: Robert Rack, Chief Circuit Mediator, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; Claudia Bernard, Circuit Mediator for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; and Howard Herman, ADR Program Counsel for
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
79 During the 15 years I have served as a magistrate judge I have hosted somewhere
between 1200 and 1400 multihour settlement conferences.
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harder just to keep the dialogue civil and the behavior of the participants
appropriate to the setting. Unlike judges who have the authority to accomplish
something simply by ruling, a mediator can resolve nothing by herself-she
understands that a mediation can produce a resolution only through an
agreement between the parties, so she has a crucial added layer of challenge
and work that. revolves around inspiring and encouraging the parties to keep
working toward a solution. Thus, a mediation makes demands on the neutrals
for active social leadership and for tenacity that trials or hearings do not make
on judges.
In addition, there can be a substantial amount of repetition in the character
of the mediation process (even in the content of the problems, in some
programs). Because the structure of the process can be similar in session after
session, there is a risk that mediations can take on a ritualistic cast (in the
mind and spirit of the mediator)-especially for neutrals who spend large
percentages of their time doing this work. A mediator who works
ritualistically will neither be effective nor respect-worthy.8 0
These are potentially dangerous combinations. There is a danger that a
mediator who spends most of each day, day in and day out, serving as a
neutral in contested matters will develop considerable fatigue-and might
develop at least some process boredom. A staff-neutral also might develop
thick, insensitive skin-either out of boredom or as a way of defending himself
from the emotional stress that this kind of work can entail. Stated differently,
there is a risk that staff professionals who are asked to do this kind of work
on a full-time basis will suffer serious bum-out after just a year or two of
80 1 may well be exaggerating the risk that full-time mediators will slip into ritual or
will experience process boredom. Apparently there are mediators in the private sector who
devote their full-time energies to this work and remain vigorous for years-although I
suspect that most such people have a more varied diet of duties than a full-time mediator
for a high-volume trial court would have. The few whom I know also devote substantial
time to teaching other mediators-and often are involved in large, complex matters that
require lots of reading and analysis between sessions (so they have good-sized breaks
between the demanding mediation sessions themselves).
There are other factors that militate against a mediator developing process boredom.
Mediation often is socially and intellectually complex and challenging, the parties are
always new, and there often are dimensions of their situation that are unique. Moreover,
thoughtful mediators can feel for many years that they are continuing to learn and
continuing to improve in their craft. Robert Rack, for example, reports that he still
continues to grow professionally, in significant ways, even after more than 15 years of
service as a staff mediator in a federal appellate court. On the other hand, there are breaks
from work as a mediator built into his job-as he also has responsibilities for some program
design, training, and administration.
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service.81 And serious bum-out usually leads either to resignation or to a
decline in the quality of the mediator's work.
A mediator who fails to bring both energy (subtle enthusiasm) and
intellectual acuity to her work is likely to provide a much less useful service-
and, perhaps more important, runs a real risk of committing serious
professional error. A tired mediator may lose sensitivities; may listen and hear
less; and may think more superficially, less reliably. More ominously, for a
tired mediator, the perennial lure of impatience will be much harder to resist.
A tired mediator will be tempted to cut too quickly to the chase (as she sees
it), or even to aggressively pressure a party to agree to terms.
These risks are not figments of my imagination. I have suffered these
pressures, experienced these fatigues, known these temptations, and, more
than once, succumbed. When I have succumbed, I have felt ashamed of the
way I have represented my court and the justice values for which it stands. On
these occasions I have done a bad job as a neutral-hurting, rather than
helping, the chances the parties otherwise had of resolving their differences.
So these foreseeable stresses on the neutrals pose potentially serious
problems-especially for courts that care deeply about the quality and integrity
of the work that is done in their name.
While my skin may be unusually thin, and while my impatience fuse may
be unusually short, I wonder how many people could do this kind of work
well on a full-time basis for a sustained period. This concern is shared by
other magistrate judges on my court who have done substantial work as
neutrals in settlement conferences.
On the other hand, there are many differences between the circumstances
under which settlement judges and staff mediators would work-and those
differences may make generalizing from my situation to theirs unreliable. 82 A
81 This is yet another arena in which we need empirical research. And the studies
should not be limited to simple statistics about turnover. We need, in addition, more subtle
probes into whether time in the job causes full-time mediators to lose enthusiasm, to cut
process corners, to become less open or sensitive, or to otherwise lower the level of their
performance. If such declines are likely to occur, when (after how much time on the job)
should we expect them? And does the incidence of this kind of problem vary with the kinds
of cases or circumstances in which the mediators work? Or vary with the roles the
mediators are asked to play (e.g., evaluative versus facilitative)?
82 1 am especially indebted to Robert Rack, Chief Mediator for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, for alerting me to differences between the situations of a
magistrate judge and a staff-neutral that might make generalizations from the one to the
other unreliable. Mr. Rack reports that in his experience, which is largely with cases
pending on appeal in the federal court system, staff mediators conduct initial mediation
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judge has a host of other duties (that a staff mediator would not have) that add
stress to the environment in which the judge performs her settlement work.
For many judges, settlement work is not the center of their job, and time
devoted to settlement negotiations represents time the judge has lost for other
work-work on motions and trials and case management. And some judges
are likely to feel that their work hosting settlement conferences does not really
have to be done-whereas the work that they lose time to do while they are
hosting settlement negotiations is work that must be done (e.g., ruling on
motions). These feelings can make a judge feel extra strain when negotiations
do not proceed efficiently.
Judges working in settlement conferences also may be more vulnerable
than staff mediators to pressures from the parties' expectations. Specifically,
many judges feel (sometimes because they are expressly told) that the parties
expect the following two demanding things from them: (1) a clear and reliable
analysis of the liability and damages dimensions of the case (an analytically
powerful "evaluation" of the merits) and (2) the ability to get the parties to
move, to press them to change their settlement positions so that the case will
be resolved. Intellectually honest settlement judges know that they often do not
know enough to reliably, or credibly, "evaluate" the case, and morally
responsible settlement judges know that it is not consistent with their oath of
office to pressure a party to settle. But the expectations of the parties (or their
lawyers) remain-and those expectations can be an added source of pressure
on a settlement judge.
sessions in only about five cases a week. They spend the rest of their time in shorter
follow-up sessions, reading and studying, and in administrative matters. Mr. Rack reports
that this work profile is sufficiently varied to prevent the kind of bum-out that I write about
in the text.
Mr. Rack has upwards of 20 years experience in his post, and his views and
experience warrant careful attention. It is important to bear in mind, however, the context
in which he has gained his insights. He works in an appellate court-and we cannot simply
assume that the mediation dynamic there is comparable to the mediation dynamic at the trial
court level. I suspect, for example, that the center of negotiation gravity in mediations at
the court of appeals level is more often in matters of law, or matters of logical analysis,
than it is in the mediations that take place in at least some kinds of state trial courts. I also
suspect that the parties are represented by counsel in a higher percentage of cases he
mediates than they would be in many state trial court programs. Moreover, Mr. Rack
works in a federal court-so the universe of cases he mediates will likely be quite different
from the universe of cases in many state trial courts, especially small claims courts, family
courts, and criminal courts. And because he works in the federal system, the volume of
cases he is expected to process may well be appreciably smaller than the volume of cases
a state trial court would expect its mediators to handle.
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At least in some programs, mediators who are staff-neutrals are less likely
to be greeted with these kinds of expectations-and thus less likely to feel the
strain that dealing with these expectations can cause.
There are additional reasons for which it might be dangerous to generalize
from judges to staff-neutrals. Judges are not selected for their skill or aptitude
as mediators, and it is not clear that many are drawn to the job because of a
love of mediation. Nor are judges well trained in interpersonal dynamics or
in techniques for psychological or emotional self-nourishment. Moreover, the
modus that serves judges best in many of their other, more traditional roles is
a modus that is counterproductive in a mediation. That is the modus of cutting
as quickly and as crisply to the chase as possible-penetrating the verbal
debris that accompanies many litigated matters in order to find the center of
the dispute, or the analytical or evidentiary pivot on which the dispute turns.
Because they spend most of their time in that mode, and because success in
that mode pays high dividends in most of their work, judges can find it
difficult to shift gears when they put on a settlement hat. Both the act of trying
to shift gears and the need to keep other impulses in check can add strains to
a judge who sits in a settlement conference that a professional mediator would
not feel.
Judges, in short, are less likely than professional ADR neutrals to find
fulfillment in the ADR process itself-and more likely to feel strain when
there is no readily measurable "outcome." All of these factors may make
judges more vulnerable to feeling an exaggerated and quite misplaced sense
of responsibility to "get the case settled." That sense not only creates stress
that a staff-neutral might not feel to the same degree, but also increases the
risk that the judge will react to that stress in behavior that hurts the settlement
dynamic as well as the public's confidence in the integrity of the court system.
Conversations with staff-neutrals have alerted me to additional reasons
why it might not be safe to draw conclusions from my experience as a
settlement judge about how long other people might sustain high levels of
engagement and performance in work as a full-time ADR neutral.
Sophisticated thinking about how long other people might sustain work as a
neutral probably requires careful attention to the roles of personality type and
personal values. When I generalize from my reactions to settlement work, I
generalize from a personality type that is essentially introverted. I have the
kind of personality that feels drained and depleted by intense social
interaction, at least if I feel some responsibility for the quality of that
interaction. After a settlement conference, I feel emotionally empty-and I
want to retreat to solitude so that I can recharge my social batteries.
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But people with extrovert personalities probably do not respond the same
way. Rather than feeling depleted by a settlement negotiation, they may feel
energized and enriched by it. They might be invigorated and fulfilled by the
social dynamic in the ADR process-so that that process itself is both a source
of sustenance and a motivator. For these personality types, the specter of more
ADR sessions, especially mediations with their focus on social interactions,
can be something to look forward to-a central reason to feel positive about
continuing in a job. A staff-neutral with this kind of personality is likely to
enjoy much greater longevity in the job than would an introvert-a fact the
selection process can take fully into account.
Personal values and personality type are by no means necessarily
linked83-but like personality type, personal values can play a significant role
in a person's ability to sustain high levels of performance as a neutral.
Different people experience a sense of fulfillment from different things. How
long a person might be happy and productive as a staff-neutral could be a
function, in substantial measure, of whether that person feels fulfilled by the
values she is called upon to serve in her role as a neutral in the particular
program. A staff-neutral who respects individual self-determination is not
likely to find value fulfillment in an ADR program in which she is expected
to pressure litigants to settle. But neutrals who work in programs that
encourage them to pursue goals they deeply respect may find the pursuit of
values they hold dear to be a source of commitment-sustaining energy. Some
staff-neutrals I know feel a deep sense of spiritual reward in their work-both
in its processes and its ultimate purposes.
The goals by which these neutrals are moved, and energized, include the
goals of healing and building interpersonal connections, and the features of
process that they find most rewarding include active, open, and empathetic
listening; constructive self-expression; creativity in searching for common
ground; and the sense of shared endeavor-of a joint effort to achieve the
common goal of finding a basis for an agreement that all parties would find
acceptable. These neutrals find meaning in the sense of community that attends
a jointly undertaken effort, even when that effort ultimately does not yield a
"solution." 84 A person who is moved by these kinds of values, and who is
83 How much value a person attaches to things like creativity or sharing is not
necessarily a function of personality type. There undoubtedly are a good many introverts
who place great personal stock in the values described in this paragraph in the text-and
a good many extroverts who could care less about them.
84 It may be that ADR programs with certain features increase the likelihood that the
neutrals will experience these kinds of satisfactions. For example, it may be that there is
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expected to pursue them in her role as a mediator, is likely to survive much
longer in her job than a person who feels no resonance in such values.
I also believe now that I underestimated, at the outset, how much capacity
for longevity can be added to a staff-neutral's job by building certain features
into it. For example, it may be possible to teach staff-neutrals how to perform
their work in ways that permit them to "take care of themselves" (their
emotional and energy needs) during the ADR process (e.g., during the
mediation). Neutrals can be trained to handle their role in ways that reduce the
likelihood that they will unnecessarily experience draining stresses caused by
exaggerating their sense of responsibility and power, or by being pulled too
far into an emotional struggle, or by permitting themselves to be baited or
challenged into defensive or aggressive reactions. It also may be possible to
teach neutrals how to release tensions, to decompress and to cleanse
themselves emotionally after a highly textured mediation 85-thus enhancing
their ability to approach their next mediation assignment with the openness
and engagement it will require. Apparently some social workers and mental
health care professionals who spend substantial time in mediation-like settings
have developed means for responding to these kinds of needs-so courts might
be well-advised to look to these other professions for useful tools.
Another, more traditional way to enhance job longevity for staff-neutrals
is to enrich their sense of professional growth through educational programs
that help the neutrals develop or refine skills they know they regularly need
in their work. Some of this kind of teaching can be done by professionals from
outside the court. They could address ADR process expertise and pertinent
substantive law, as well as communication skills and psychological sciences.
Learning from experts in relevant fields from outside the law can be especially
rewarding. Another vehicle for learning that can be especially useful is
comediating, either with process experts brought in from outside the court, or
with other neutrals from the court's ADR staff. Comediating with another
sophisticated professional may be the best single device for extending a
neutral's understanding of the process, enhancing her sensitivity to signals
from the parties, and adding to the repertoire of responses on which she can
draw to sustain a settlement dynamic.
a greater likelihood that the process will be accompanied by a sense of shared purpose, and
a constructive tone, in programs in which the parties come to the ADR session
voluntarily-or, perhaps, after some kind of noncoercive pep talk.
85 For example, one technique that may help achieve some of these ends is to find a
very different subject, shortly after a mediation, on which to fully concentrate one's focus.
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There are three other features that courts could build into staff-neutrals'
jobs that probably would extend longevity in these positions. The first consists
of some-not necessarily extensive-diversity of tasks. Even limited diversion
into other, less demanding tasks would reduce the risk of exhaustion. So
asking the neutrals to do some of the administrative, training, and monitoring
work that running a court program entails might be wise. Second, courts
should include staff-neutrals in the creativity of program design, assessment,
and reform. By involving the neutrals meaningfully in such work, a court
capitalizes fully on their knowledge, motivates them to be more reflective
about their work, and evidences a respect for their views and their ability to
contribute that will make them feel appreciated, more responsible for the
quality of the program, and more connected to the institution.
Finally, courts should try to structure the neutrals' jobs or roles so that
they have some control over some elements of their work. The court might
ask the neutrals, for example, to help identify which cases should receive
ADR services, or to help identify the point in the cases' development at which
the ADR session should occur, or to fix the pace or duration of the mediation
efforts. Giving the staff-neutrals some control over such matters can be
important to their self-respect as professionals, can enhance their sense of
responsibility and engagement, and can create valuable opportunities for
learning-for identifying ways to improve the process in individual cases or
the design or implementation of the program as a whole.
While the list of job features that I have described in the preceding
paragraphs might seem intimidating, we should not exaggerate the burden of
building these kinds of features into a staff-neutral program. The teaching I
described can and should be occasional, not constant, and several courts could
pool resources to support it. Some outsiders can be persuaded to help the court
without charge. And it would not be difficult to adjust job profiles to build in
modest amounts of diversity and creativity-just a little of which might go a
long way toward supporting the energy and tenure of the staff-neutrals.
Another way to reduce the risk of bum-out by staff-neutrals would be to
make their positions only part-time, so that no one would be called upon to
work in this capacity on a full-time basis. Thus, if a court needed the
equivalent of three full-time mediators, it could consider hiring six people on
a half-time basis. A court that considers this option, however, faces some
complicating factors. First, the court would have to develop thorough and
precisely framed conflict of interest rules-so that people who might be
interested in working part time for the court and part time in the private sector
would know what kinds of private work they could accept and what kinds they
would be required to turn away. If the court permitted its part-time neutrals
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to have a private law practice or a private mediation practice in tandem with
their public employment, the court also would be well-advised to take special
steps (through public pronouncements and rules) to assure the public that the
court's mediators were not using their public work as a base for building their
private practices. Finally, with its proposed conflicts rules well publicized, the
court should do some probing of the market to be sure the court could attract
people with the requisite qualities and experience to part-time positions that
were accompanied by possibly substantial restrictions on outside work.
Having explored these issues at some length, I end up not being sure how
great the risk is that full-time staff-neutrals will burn out after only a couple
of years on the job-and either quit or suffer a serious drop in the quality of
their work. The occasion for concern would seem most obvious in courts that
would expect their staff-neutrals to play an assertive and evaluative role and
that would call upon them to serve, on a constant basis, a high volume of
intellectually or emotionally demanding cases in a narrow band of subject
matters or circumstances. But the decision is not clear cut even for courts who
would put their mediators in that kind of environment-in part because there
are a large number of other positives about the staff-neutral model, and in part
because there also are challenges to retaining the services of high quality
neutrals in many of the other models.
For example, there are potential difficulties (with different sources)
retaining high quality neutrals under the models that rely on occasional service
by unpaid volunteers or by people who are compensated at well below market
rates. One risk is that neutrals who are involved in ADR sessions only
occasionally will lose interest, will become emotionally or philosophically
disengaged and drift away-and either remove themselves from the roster or
perform poorly or perfunctorily. Another source of risk to retaining neutrals
under these models is competition from the neutrals' "real" work-their
private practices (e.g., law, psychology, counseling, or mediation) or the
other job on which their income depends. For occasional neutrals, the
commitment to the court is something that can be sacrificed if the pressures
from their other world become too great.
Another related source of risk under these models is the lure of private
ADR work for which the neutral is paid at full market rates. This problem is
most acute for the best neutrals-it is their services that the private sector is
likely to demand most vigorously and to pay for most handsomely. If the
demand in the private sector for high quality neutral services continues to
grow, courts using these models might face substantial difficulties retaining the
services of their best neutrals.
[Vol. 14:3 19991
COMPARING STRUCTURES FOR DELIVERY OF ADR SERVICES BY COURTS
I hasten to report, however, that none of these potential sources of
difficulty has caused serious retention problems in the ADR program in the
Northern District of California, which relies heavily on occasional pro bono
service by a large cadre of court-trained private attorneys. While we have lost
a few neutrals from our panel over the years to "drift" or to competition from
their "real" (paying) work, the vast majority of our neutrals find sufficient
nonfinancial reward in this form of public service, and in the break from the
advocate's role, to remain on our rosters for many years. We also take visible
steps to keep our occasional neutrals feeling valued and involved. We sponsor
regular in-service trainings, we invite experienced neutrals to participate in
round table discussions organized around specific subjects or kinds of cases,
and we involve many of our neutrals in our on-going efforts to evaluate and
improve our programs, as well as in the trainings we sponsor for new neutrals
and the educational programs we conduct for users of our ADR services.8 6 In
addition, the court invites all its neutrals to a formal reception every few
years, where we acknowledge their public service and present certificates of
appreciation.
A court that relies on an outside organization to orchestrate the provision
of ADR services by neutrals who serve only on an occasional basis should be
sure that organization takes steps to address possible retention problems.
Retention problems could be more severe under this model than under the
model where the court itself orchestrates the delivery of the services-at least
when most of the neutrals are lawyers-unless the neutrals have some
additional, commitment-sustaining connection to the outside organization.
Retention problems also can afflict programs in which the court pays
private mediators or firms to provide the neutral services-unless the court can
pay virtually full market rates.
I have no basis for assessing the severity of the "retention" problem under
the model in which the court sends the parties into the private sector to hire
their own neutral. I have no idea how stable the "stable" of private providers
might be under this model-but I assume the answer would vary, perhaps
considerably, from place to place and between various sub-specialties within
the larger world of ADR providers. (It would not be surprising if the stability
86 For example, over the years we have involved lawyers on our panels in developing
special protocols or approaches for intellectual property cases, in refining the ENE process,
in tightening the administration of the arbitration program, in developing ideas about how
to respond to ethical dilemmas or process problems that surface repeatedly during
mediations, and in refining conflicts of interest rules. We also regularly involve a good
many of the lawyers on our panels in the trainings we sponsor for new neutrals and for the
users of our ADR programs.
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of the pool of family law neutrals, for example, was different from the
stability of the pool of neutrals for intellectual property cases.)
D. Performance Enhancing Incentives
Which of the models we are comparing offers the neutrals the greatest
incentives to high quality performance? In which model are the neutrals likely
to give most of themselves to the ADR effort and to care most about how well
they do their neutral job?
Is a staff mediator likely to feel greater incentives to do her job well than
a mediator who is not on the court staff? Or is a person who is not on the
court staff, but who looks to paid work as a mediator as a significant source
of income, likely to have greater incentive than a staff mediator to perform
well? Or are incentives to perform well likely to be greatest among civic-
minded volunteers-people who serve simply because they believe in the
work, people who serve without pay and without any expectation that work
as a mediator will represent a significant source of income?
I know of no reliable empirical answers to these questions-so we are
constrained to identify factors that might get some play in the ultimate
equations. As I have worked my way through these factors I have gravitated
toward the view that performance enhancing incentives are likely to be
greatest in the staff-neutral model. Several considerations support this tentative
conclusion. The first focuses on the closeness of the connection between the
neutrals and the court. As I suggest in the next section, this closeness can be
a source of role-distorting pressures, but it also can be a source of a good
many emotionally powerful positive forces. Full-time staff-neutrals are likely
to have a greater investment in the quality and success of a court program than
neutrals serving in any other capacity. Their tenure in their positions, and thus
their income, depends on how well they perform. 87 Perhaps as important,
their sense of self-worth and their professional self-respect turns fully (not
marginally) on the quality of the service they provide. Because they are likely
87 As I discuss in the next section, there also are serious potential downsides to a
mediator believing that her job security depends on how well she performs-at least if she
is afraid that the court that employs her will crudely measure her success by the rate at
which "she" "settles" cases that she mediates. A more sophisticated court appreciates, of
course, that no mediator ever settled a case-only parties settle cases. And, hopefully,
many courts will be sure to make clear to their mediators that what they care most about
is the quality of the process the mediator helps orchestrate, not whether that process yields
a settlement.
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to identify most with their program, they also are likely to care the most that
the parties and the judges perceive the work they do as valuable. And the
desire to have the parties value the work they perform can drive staff-neutrals
to behave in ways the parties respect and that are responsive to the parties'
values and needs. Stated more succinctly, full-time staff-neutrals are likely to
have the greatest ego-investment in the quality of the ADR program. And,
other things being equal, the people with the greatest ego-investment in a
program are the people likely to bring the most energy and effort to their
work.
Staff-neutrals not only are most motivated to earn positive feedback from
program participants and judges-they also are positioned to have the best
access to feedback, to be most aware of it-and thus to learn most from it and
use it most to improve their performance. Moreover, a court's ability to
monitor the behavior of its mediators is greatest when the mediators are full-
time employees. Enhanced ability to monitor can be accompanied by enhanced
ability to encourage, by praise and reward, desired behaviors-as well as
enhanced ability to detect and discipline behaviors that are not desired.
The closeness of the connection between the full-time staff-neutrals and
the court can be a source of another, related set of forces that can drive staff-
neutrals toward positive behaviors. People who work full time for the court
are more likely than others to be infected thoroughly by the values that drive
and dominate the justice system: integrity, impartiality, fairness, fidelity to
widely endorsed societal norms, and public service. When one works full time
in a court, one's environment and mission push one to view justice as the
client. And when one believes that justice is the client, one is inclined toward
behaviors that generate respect. In addition, when one works full time in a
court one absorbs the importance of judicial temperament and demeanor-one
observes up close, and often, the respect that judges who behave respectfully
and appropriately earn, and one feels the disrespect that judges suffer when
their conduct deviates from these norms. In these and other ways (including
formal indoctrination and job requirements), courts have appreciably greater
capacity to infect with justice and service values those mediators who work
full time as employees of the judiciary than those mediators who work
primarily outside the court system.
There is one kind of incentive with respect to which the staff-neutral
model might not be as attractive as some of the others. In the staff-neutral
model, the amount of money the mediator is paid does not vary with how well
she performs. In two of the other models, the lure of greater income and the
risk of income loss could play motivational roles. This factor could be at play
under the model in which the court pays private neutrals (or firms of neutrals)
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to provide the ADR services and in the model under which the court directs
the parties to choose (and pay at market rates) a private neutral from a roster
the court has approved. In these two models the amount of work the neutral
gets could depend in part on how well the neutral performs. But I suspect that
the real power of this kind of economic incentive lends itself to exaggeration.
The rates that courts will be able to pay neutrals often will fall below true
market values-a fact that would dilute what otherwise might be more
powerful economic incentives in the model in which the court pays private
neutrals. And many courts that use the model in which the parties are required
to pay the market rate fees of the neutrals maintain very large rosters of
potential service providers-so most persons on those rosters could not
realistically expect to be chosen often enough to generate a substantial portion
of their income.
Outside the arena of economics, the incentives to high quality
performance might vary considerably among the non-staff-neutral models-but
in none would the private neutrals have the same level of ego-investment in
the quality or success of the court's program as would full-time employees of
the court. The sense of identification with the success of the court's program
would seem most attenuated when an outside organization orchestrates the
provision of the ADR services and when the court simply directs the parties
to pay a neutral they select from a long list maintained in the clerk's office.
Under these models the risk may be greatest that the neutral's performance
will be perfunctory.
I hasten to add, however, that our court (the Northern District of
California) has had a very positive experience with the energy and
commitment that volunteer mediators can bring to their occasional work as
neutrals. Many of our volunteers are prepared to give many hours of their
time, without pay, to a single case-precisely because they do this work only
a few times a year. Many come to the work of neutraling with a freshness and
a commitment that is invigorating. Because they spend most of the rest of their
time being advocates, or in settings in which their objectives are not fully
unassailable, they really enjoy putting on their neutral hat and playing a role
that is designed to be wholly constructive. They are energized by the
opportunity to help other people-especially by the opportunity to help other
people avoid some of the pain and expense and strain that they know (all too
well) often accompany formal litigation. So they usually give a lot of
themselves-trying hard to provide the litigants they serve with valuable
assistance. And because they are bright and knowledgeable, the work they do
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usually is well received by the parties. 88 What is less clear, as I discuss in a
later section, is how closely they are able to follow procedural protocols and
how sophisticated their tools are for maximizing the productivity of their ADR
sessions and for responding to problems and to ethical dilemmas.
E. Role-Distorting Pressures
, The vulnerability of neutrals to role-distorting pressures appears to vary
considerably among the models we are comparing.
Before turning to that comparison, it is important to emphasize that,
cutting across all models, one of the most dangerous possible sources of such
pressures is the court itself. Under every model, judges and court
administrators will create pressures on their neutrals to misbehave, most
obviously by pressuring litigants to settle, if the judges and administrators
insist simple-mindedly on measuring the success of their ADR program only
or excessively by the incidence and timing of settlement. I explore this point
first in the context of the staff-neutral model.
As discussed above, mediators (and neutrals in other ADR processes) who
work full time in a court are likely to care more about what the judges and
court administrators think of the way they perform than mediators who are not
full-time employees. Whether this fact encourages positive or negative
behaviors by the court-employed mediators depends on which values they
believe are most important to the judges and judicial administrators. If they
believe that values that revolve around process integrity are most important
to the judges, the proximity of these mediators to the judges, and their desire
to please the judges, will operate as an important force promoting high quality
service.
On the other hand, if the mediators believe that process values are less
important to the judges than increasing the incidence of settlement, then
proximity to the judges and a desire to please them could leave staff-neutrals
especially vulnerable to role-distorting pressures. This is a real risk-with
potentially very serious negative repercussions. A mediator who is a full-time
employee of a court is more vulnerable than at least most other mediators89 to
pressure from judges to get cases settled. The employee-mediator is more
likely to feel that the judges are watching-and if the employee-mediator
88 See STENSTRA ET AL., supra note 6, at 192-193, 206-208.
89 A mediator nominally in the private sector who felt dependent on a steady or
growing stream of referrals from a court might be just as vulnerable to pressures of this
kind.
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believes that what matters most to the judges is getting settlements, the
mediator also is likely to fear that the judges are keeping a crude accounting
of settlement rates. A mediator who believes that her work is being judged by
such measures might succumb to the temptation to cut ethical or process
corners to try to increase the number of agreements produced through her
mediations. She is more likely, for example, to resort to manipulation, or even
to overt pressure on parties. These kinds of behaviors will promote disrespect
for the court as an institution and for the law generally.
Because the risk just described is real and potentially dangerous, courts
that decide to hire full-time mediators should go to considerable lengths to
make sure that their staff-neutrals understand that process integrity is much
more important to the judges than anything else, including, specifically,
settlement rates. Without being explicitly reassured about this, staff mediators
might assume that their core responsibility is to maximize the number of
settlements-that the judges hired them to reduce their work load or backlog
and that the only way to achieve these ends is to increase the settlement rate.
Court employees who are not unequivocally disabused of these assumptions
could cause great harm to the public's confidence in the court system by,
among other things, pressuring litigants to accept settlements they do not want
to accept.
Maintaining the confidentiality of ADR proceedings may be another arena
in which staff-neutrals are more vulnerable to pressures from judges. As I
mentioned earlier, there is anecdotal evidence from programs in Ohio that the
likelihood that there will be inappropriate communication between the neutral
and the judge is greater in programs in which the neutrals are full-time
employees of the court than in programs in which the neutrals are drawn from
pools of otherwise privately employed professionals. Administrators of ADR
programs in Ohio have developed concerns about judges engaging in
inappropriate communications with staff mediators-as judges are keenly
interested in the status of cases assigned to them and are not always sensitive
to the confidentiality rules. This points to the need to be vigilant in educating
judges about the special policies and rules that have been developed for ADR
programs.
There would appear to be less risk under the other models that perceived
pressure from the judges, or a misplaced desire to please the judges, could
lead to bad practices by neutrals. Neutrals who serve only occasionally, or
who are not dependent on work sent from the court for significant portions of
their income, are not likely to care as much what the judges think-and are
not as likely to know what they think. Remoteness is their protection.
Similarly, neutrals whose service is provided through an outside organization
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will likely feel more insulated from potentially process-corrupting judicial
pressures-unless the outside organization uses only settlement rates to
measure the value of the work it provides.
The volume of cases that the neutrals are expected to handle is another
potential source of role-distorting pressure. Neutrals who are required to
service an unreasonably large volume of cases might become impatient,
abandon their listening skills, or resort prematurely and crudely to pressure
tactics in an effort to "efficiently" push the parties to settle-or at least to get
to their "bottom line" settlement positions. There also is a risk that neutrals
who are forced to service too many cases will react in the opposite way-by
retreating into passivity and giving up on the negotiations too early-in order
to conserve their resources for the cases that remain, perennially, in line.
I suspect that the staff-neutral model is the most vulnerable to the court
assigning an unrealistic volume of work. Under that model the court might
feel that it can be most demanding because the court's resources, which could
otherwise be committed to other court work, are being used to pay directly the
full salaries of the neutrals. The model which is next most vulnerable to this
problem probably is the model in which the court pays the fees of private
neutrals.
Another potential source of role-distorting pressure is money. A neutral
who is paid by the hour might be tempted to move more slowly than the
circumstances justify, or to keep the parties in negotiations even after it is
clear that nothing productive could be accomplished. It is not clear that this
kind of risk has developed into a significant problem in any program-and it
would appear to pose a real threat only when the hourly payment the neutrals
receive is at or near true market rates. Neutrals who could find more lucrative
ways to spend their professional time are not likely to artificially extend an
ADR session.
When the neutrals are not paid at all, or when they are paid at well below
market rates, the money factor could distort their service in the opposite
direction. They could be tempted to give the ADR session and the parties
short shrift. As I reported above, this problem has not surfaced in any
substantial way in the Northern District's program (which relies largely on
unpaid volunteers), in part because we ask our neutrals to serve only
occasionally. I suspect that the risk of "under-service" by the neutrals is
greatest in programs that simultaneously underpay and over-demand-i.e.,
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when the neutrals are paid, but appreciably below market rates,9° and when
the court requires them to service a substantial volume of cases.
F. Capacity to Develop and Retain Refined Process Skills
We turn at this juncture to another important issue: are there significant
differences in the capacities of the different models to develop refined process
skills in neutrals, or in capacities to assure that such skills, once learned, are
not lost? I believe that the answer to this question very likely is yes-and that
the staff-neutral model offers significant advantages in this important arena
over at least most of the others.
I begin my exploration of this question by describing some of my
concerns about our program in the Northern District-where the vast majority
of the neutrals are private lawyers who have active litigation practices and
who serve only a few times a year, almost always on a pro bono basis. These
lawyers are experienced litigators who are bright and who have appropriate
temperaments. But they usually come to us with little past experience as a
neutral in ADR-and even after they join our panel of neutrals they usually
devote only a small percentage of their time to working in that capacity. They
remain, primarily, litigators.
When we admit lawyers to our panel we require them to complete
successfully a fairly substantial training course-which involves at least some
role play and gives our trainers a chance to assess, at least superficially, how
well they have learned the fundamentals of the particular ADR process that is
the subject of the training. But the training is in. no sense exhaustive, and we
impose no requirement that our new admittees observe some real ADR
sessions, or cohost some such sessions, before we permit them to take on their
first case. Perhaps as significant, there often is a gap of several months
between the time they complete the training and the time they receive their
first ADR assignment. Then there usually is a gap of several more months
between their first and their second case.
This system suffers from some substantial pedagogical limitations91-and
I worry about whether it is capable of imparting process skills that are
90 The risk that the neutrals will devote insufficient time and energy to their work also
could attend a program that paid the neutrals not by the hour, but by the case-if, under the
per case rate, neutrals who devote an appropriate level of effort to the ADR sessions end
up with compensation that is well below what their time would otherwise be worth.
91 The significance of these limitations depends in some measure on assumptions one
makes about how difficult it is to be good in the neutral role-about how much training one
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sufficiently sophisticated and sensitive. Our neutrals' learning is not compact
and is not very deep. And we have little control over its reliability. The gap
between the initial training and the first assignment as a neutral, and the
subsequent gaps between opportunities to serve, mean that our volunteer
neutrals do not have a chance to compare processes in close temporal
proximity. Nor are they exposed, through volume of service, to as many of
the problems and obstacles to productive mediations that full-time mediators
see-and from which their full-time counterparts learn and refine their craft.
Stated simply, they have substantially fewer opportunities to practice. So they
have fewer chances to identify the approaches and techniques that work best
for them, to develop the capacity to detect sources of difficulty in the process
or of concern to the participants, and to experiment with ways of responding
that build the parties' trust and that improve the likelihood that the mediation
will be productive.
Our volunteers also are not anywhere nearly as well suited as staff
professionals to be observed in their work and to be taught-by program
directors or by one another. They perform their neutral services for the most
part outside the court-so the program directors have little opportunity to give
them direct feedback or to make suggestions. Nor do other neutrals have an
opportunity to observe their work. And while our program directors have built
in some opportunities for focused training programs and for exchanges of
experiences and insights through informal breakfast and lunch meetings of
groups of our volunteers, these opportunities are no match for the regular
learning and teaching that staff-neutrals can provide for one another. In sum,
our volunteer neutrals are at a substantial learning disadvantage, compared to
staff-neutrals, both through direct experience and through education by others.
In combination, these circumstances mean that in some measure our
neutrals must reinvent their procedures each time they serve. The months
between mediations create a risk that our neutrals will forget some of what
they were taught when they were trained and will fail to follow procedural
protocols. These gaps also create a risk that our neutrals will make process
errors, or respond badly to developments in the sessions with the parties,
thereby not only reducing the quality and value of their work, but also
harming the reputation of the program and confidence in the court. These
risks are not limited to our program-they would arise under any model that
needs, about how subtle and demanding the particular ADR process is. These are questions
that I addressed early in this Essay-and that do not admit of answers that are either easy
or necessarily the same in all program contexts.
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relied on occasional service by people who do not commit substantial portions
of their time to comparable kinds of work as a neutral.
In sharp contrast, learning by staff-neutrals can be faster, more efficient,
deeper, and more reliable. 92 A very compact learning environment permits
staff-neutrals to more quickly develop sophisticated process skills and
sensitivities. Constant use of those skills reinforces lessons learned and
virtually eliminates the risk that the neutrals will forget procedural protocols
or make the kind of serious errors of professional judgment that can cause
substantial harm to the public's confidence in a court's program. So,
compared to our occasionally serving volunteers, it is likely that how staff-
neutrals go about their work is more predictable, more reliable, and more
sophisticated.
How other models fare in comparison to staff-neutrals depends in part on
how frequently the neutrals serve, either in the court's program or in process-
parallel settings, and on how tightly their education and training are
controlled.
To reduce some of the risks I just described, courts that send parties into
the private sector, or that pay private mediators to service their cases, or that
have an outside organization arrange the neutrals' service, should impose at
least minimum training, experience, and frequency of service requirements.
Even when sponsoring courts build in such requirements, however, no other
model is likely to provide neutrals with more compact, deeper, and more
reliable learning than the staff-neutral model.
G. Performance Quality Control: Capacity, Efficiency, and Regulatory
Reach
In the preceding sections, we have examined some of the forces and
factors that could affect the level of risk, under the various models, that
neutrals will deviate from performance expectations. As we have seen, the
magnitude of this risk appears to vary a great deal from model to model-but
there can be no doubt that this risk is real and, under some models, sizeable.
One of the more troubling things I have learned over the years that I have
been responsible for our court's ADR programs is that neutrals ostensibly
performing the same role (e.g., as a mediator) more than occasionally do not
follow the same procedural protocols. Instead, a wide range of procedures
92 By "reliable" I mean, in this setting, learning that the neutrals are likely to retain
and that is likely to guide their conduct each time they play the neutral role.
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have been used93-all given the same name (e.g., "mediation"). So even some
major features of what the "mediation" process consists of can depend, too
much, on who the neutral is and what her individual understanding of
"mediation" is.
These facts make the issue of "performance quality control" important.
Every court must know what is being done in its name. No responsible court
can place its imprimatur on, and send parties off to participate in, proceedings
whose elements and basic character are unknown or out of control. Parties
have a right to know what they are getting into. They need to tailor their
preparation for the ADR session to the specific character of the process-and
we can expect the ADR sessions to be less useful, and less appreciated, if
there is a difference between the procedures the parties think they will
encounter and the procedures the neutral actually employs. Another reason
that it is important for the neutrals to follow predictable (and prescribed)
procedural protocols is that judges cannot make reasoned decisions about
whether to refer cases to a particular ADR process unless they know what the
content of that process actually will be-and unless they can reliably predict
how that process will differ from other processes that they might consider. It
follows that the essentials of processes that have the same name must be the
same in fact.
For all of these reasons, it is important to compare the ability of the
models to deliver predictable behaviors by their neutrals. And an important
part of this comparison is an assessment of the likely costs of delivering that
predictability. In essence, our inquiry here is into the politically charged arena
of "regulation"-and we must ask not only about the capacity to regulate
93 We encountered one of the more disturbing illustrations of this problem when we
were conducting a training of "arbitrators" for our court-sponsored program under the
then-current version of 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994). (As noted earlier, this statute was
revised in late 1998-and is now part of the broader Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998).) Shortly after we had commenced this
particular training session one of the most senior members of our panel raised his hand and
said, in effect: "Why are we going to spend all this time being trained in your arbitration
procedures? I already know what arbitration is. It is just a settlement conference with
another name."
This statement was made years after Congress had passed a set of specific rules
governing the procedures for the court-annexed arbitration programs in federal district
courts-procedures that made (and still make) arbitrations in these settings vastly different
from "settlement conferences." See the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act
of 1988-which, until October of 1998, comprised 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994).
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under each model, but also about the price tag (in money and
bureaucratization, among other factors) of an effective regulatory system.
Pursuing these questions, our first observation is about differences in
levels of risk that a court will lose touch with, or track of, what is being done
in the name of its ADR program. The model in which the ADR services are
provided directly by full-time employees of the court creates the least risk that
the court will not know what its ADR neutrals are doing. Staff-neutrals are
most likely to do their work in or near the courthouse, are easiest to observe,
and can be debriefed most readily (and least offensively) by a program
director or supervising judicial officer. Moreover, an ADR program that relies
on full-time employees to deliver the ADR services is likely to involve the
fewest number of neutrals. Simply stated, it is easier to keep track of what a
small group of employees is doing than a large group of persons who perform
their work in a myriad of settings, most of them at some distance from the
courthouse.
The greatest risk that the court will lose touch with what is being done in
its name arises under the models that involve large pools or lists of neutrals
with attenuated connections to the court. The model that is most vulnerable to
this problem is the model in which a court sends parties into the private
market to find and pay their own neutral. It would only be by expending
considerable resources monitoring and regulating the neutrals on an approved
list that a court using this model could be reasonably confident that the
neutrals were adhering closely to prescribed protocols and rules.
Courts that rely on large groups of volunteers 94 who serve only
occasionally face a quality control challenge of similar magnitude. It would
be extremely difficult and expensive to regularly monitor or meaningfully
debrief the many neutrals who serve in these programs. And because the
people who serve as the neutrals in these programs usually are accomplished
professionals in their own right, at least some of them might not react well to
being monitored or debriefed on a regular basis.
There should be somewhat less risk that the court will "lose touch" under
models in which the court pays neutrals it has screened-at least if those
neutrals are professionals who regularly commit substantial percentages of
their time to ADR work. Courts that delegate responsibility to administer their
ADR program to an outside organization are dependent on the tightness of the
controls that organization maintains.
94 For purposes of this discussion, there would be no meaningful difference between
models that rely on unpaid "volunteers" and models in which the neutrals are paid (by the
court or the parties) well below market rates-but serve only occasionally.
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As these comments suggest, there are several major components of an
effective system for maintaining a high level of performance quality control:
attracting and selecting high quality people to serve; training them well;
monitoring their work "in the field"; establishing systems to acquire feedback
(primarily from the parties and their lawyers, but also from other neutrals,
from program managers, and from ADR teachers) about how well the neutrals
performed; funneling that evaluative feedback to the neutrals; and re-educating
or disciplining neutrals whose performance falls short of established standards.
It is persuasively arguable that virtually all of these functions can be
performed most effectively, at the least cost, and with the least intrusion into
the private sector when the neutrals are full-time employees of the court.
Conversely, the larger the group of neutrals, the more diverse their
backgrounds and inclinations, and the more attenuated their connection to the
court, the more difficult and expensive it will be to establish effective systems
for training, monitoring, and disciplining their performance. Moreover, when
the pool of neutrals is large and drawn from the private sector, achieving real
performance quality control is likely to involve the court in the most
burdensome and intrusive regulatory effort.
The first component of a good quality control system, of course, consists
of enlisting the services of high quality people to serve as the neutrals. I
already have discussed the different capacities of the models to attract and
identify the people with the most promise as ADR neutrals. It is worth
repeating here, however, that without good "screening" for high quality
people at the front end of the system, the "base" on which the rest of a quality
control system would operate would be unreliable. And that unreliability could
compromise, seriously, the capacity of the rest of the system to achieve its
goals. It also is worth repeating that while it is not clear that the staff-neutral
model enables the court to attract the people with the most talent, that model
does offer, clearly, the most reliable screening of candidates-and so creates
the least risk, by far, that someone who is likely to make serious errors, or to
embarrass the court, would end up serving.
It also is clear that training and monitoring are likely to be least expensive
and most effective under the staff-neutral model-as are systems for acquiring
feedback from participants and for making sure that feedback actually reaches
the neutrals and affects their job performance. Similarly, detecting instances
in which neutrals "stray" from prescribed procedures or violate rules is easiest
under the staff-neutral model. Imposing discipline also is easiest under this
model-as long as the discipline called for is not severe.
As noted earlier, responding effectively when there is a need for severe
discipline might be appreciably more difficult when the neutral is an employee
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of the court than when the neutral is not. Firing a staff-neutral could be legally
difficult and time-consuming, and it could take substantial time to replace a
fired staff-neutral. In sharp contrast, removing a poorly performing neutral is
likely to be much less disruptive to a program, and much less difficult (as a
matter of sociology and as a matter of law), if the neutral is one of many
people in a large pool of private persons to whom ADR work is only
occasionally referred. While removing a person from such a pool "for cause"
will not be painless, 95 and should be done with appropriate levels of
procedural fairness, there are fewer emotional and legal obstacles to initiating
and completing such a removal process with a person who is not an employee
of the court or whose livelihood does not depend on referrals from the court.
Finally, there is the controversial matter of public "regulation." When the
pool of neutrals is large and comprised primarily of persons who are not full-
time court employees, there is likely to be a greater need to establish
regulations not only about how the neutrals perform their work, but also about
the circumstances in which they may serve (e.g., qualifications, conflicts of
interest, or availability), the consequences to them and to others of serving
(e.g., preclusion from accepting employment of specified kinds or from
certain parties after they have served),96 and the economic arrangements that
attend their work (e.g., how much they may be paid or by whom). It is likely
that the difficulty of developing regulations whose content and reach is
sufficient will vary directly with the number and diversity of the circumstances
of the people who serve as neutrals. Figuring out what the rules should be for
a small group of staff mediators is likely to be much easier than figuring out
what the rules should be for a large, heterogeneous group that includes people
with a wide range of other professional and economic involvements and
interests. 97 And after the regulations are developed, the job of enforcing them
95 Generally, I would expect the difficulty of removing a neutral from a panel to vary
with length of time the person has been serving as a neutral for the court and the extent to
which the person reasonably has come to depend for a significant percentage of her income
on referrals from the court's program.
96 The opinion in Poly Software International v. Datamost Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1487
(D. Utah 1995), suggests the difficulty even of figuring out how to think, reliably, about
conflicts of interest in these kinds of settings. Chief Judge Winder's examination of the
conflict of interest issues is one of the most sophisticated in a reported decision-and
exposes some of the challenges that "regulators" face when they try to craft rules for
neutrals who are employed primarily in the private sector.
97 Some courts may elect to reduce these kinds of burdens on themselves by delegating
responsibility for at least some aspects of regulating neutrals to another institution-e.g.,
a nonprofit foundation or bar group, or to an association of professional neutrals. Before
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will require more resources and personnel, and will inject the public further
into the private sector, under models that rely on large numbers of neutrals
who are primarily employed in the private sector.
VIII. THE MOBILE AND MULTIPLE "BOTTOM LRMS"
Like some parties who attend mediations without understanding the
principles of the process, readers who are looking for crisp directives and an
uncomplicated argument for the superiority of a single model for delivering
ADR services will be disappointed by this Essay. It is quite likely that no one
model is superior in all settings-even for those who are willing to limit their
vision to the values on which I have focused. The "bottom line" of our inquiry
is mobile-likely changing with a host of assumptions and variables, as well
as with the specific context in which that bottom line is sought. Among the
many pertinent factors, it is especially important that we attend to the
prioritized purposes of the particular ADR program, to the kinds of cases and
parties to be served, whether participation is mandatory or voluntary, whether
the parties are represented by counsel, the volume of cases the system will be
asked to accommodate, and the role the court wants the neutrals to play.
We also must emphasize the role that "guessing" plays in our thinking
about these matters. There is little or no empirical foundation for most of what
I have written. Until rigorous research lays a sound foundation for policy
decisions in this arena, it is especially important that we remain open and
flexible-committed to learning as we go and to making changes in our
systems as we learn. It follows that we need to be careful not to get so rigidly
committed to any given model that we cannot make adjustments if clear
reasons for shifting gears emerge.
It is at least comparably important, however, not to permit the elusiveness
of full confidence in our choices to lead us to stasis. Because we know that
ADR is capable of delivering much of value to litigants in some
circumstances, we should push forward-perhaps less ambitiously than we
might otherwise-but forward. It is in that mode that we might consider the
delegating any such responsibilities, however, a court would have to review carefully (and
approve) the content of the other entity's regulations and its systems for monitoring and
enforcement. Such a court also would have to set up a system to review or audit
periodically the way the "partner" institution was meeting its responsibilities-to be sure
that unacceptable changes were not made and that there remained a sufficiently tight
connection between promise and reality.
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following out-of-context suggestions about the pros and cons of the models we
have been asked to compare.
I have been surprised, as I have worked through this material, by the
number of important values with respect to which the staff-neutral model
seems to be the most attractive. Before recapping those values, it is important
to emphasize, however, that I have no clear idea, most of the time, about how
much better this model is than at least some of the alternatives-or how much
difference particular considerations make to users of ADR systems.
It follows that there is a risk that a long list of values with respect to
which the staff-neutral model appears superior (again, out of the context of
any specific program) could be misleading. If this model turns out to be only
marginally superior in many of these areas of comparison, the list could
overstate this model's attractiveness-especially if the values with respect to
which a competing model is clearly more attractive are very important to the
sponsoring court. For example, if a particular sponsoring court believes that
providing ADR services to a large number of cases is extremely important, or
that public confidence in the system would be seriously jeopardized unless the
pool of neutrals was large and very diverse, the fact that the staff-neutral
model offers advantages with respect to many other values might not be all
that important-if those advantages turned out to be relatively modest. All this
is to say that the important judgments here can be subtle and must be made
independently by each court or court system-according to the value hierarchy
it has established for itself.
Bearing all these cautions in mind, I suggest that the staff-neutral model
is most likely to inspire confidence in the motives that drive the court to
establish an ADR program, most likely to signal that the court values ADR
processes, least likely to inspire feelings that ADR processes are second rate
and that litigants whose cases proceed through an ADR program are second
class, most likely to communicate that the court defines itself as a service-
oriented institution, and most likely to inspire a sense of gratitude toward the
court and a feeling of connection to our society.
Two models seem likely to inspire the most confidence in the motives of
the neutrals-the staff-neutral model and the model that relies on service by
unpaid volunteers. The neutrals may enjoy the greatest presumption of respect
under the staff-neutral model. The model that could be next most attractive
from this perspective is the model in which an outside organization
orchestrates the delivery of the services by the neutrals-as long as the
particular outside organization enjoys widespread respect in the affected parts
of the community.
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Comparing the models with respect to various dimensions of
"democratization" yields a more complex picture. The economic and
procedural barriers to participation are likely to be lowest under the staff-
neutral model. Barriers to participation based on fear, ignorance, or distrust
of the process and its purposes also probably are lowest under this model.
Similarly, this model probably is least likely to provoke concerns about
conflicts of interest or biases in the neutrals.
On the other hand, the staff-neutral model is clearly inferior to the extent
that a visibly diverse panel of neutrals is important to inspiring confidence in
the political or moral integrity of a program, or confidence in the capacity of
the neutrals to understand and appropriately empathize with the litigants' real-
world circumstances. Models that use large pools of neutrals offer obvious
advantages from these perspectives. These models also offer courts a
substantially greater capacity to provide parties with neutrals who have subject
matter expertise-at least if the goal is to provide such expertise to a wide
range of cases.
Models that rely on large pools of neutrals98 also are superior with respect
to two additional aspects of "democratization"-both potentially important.
First, these models equip courts to offer ADR services to much larger
numbers of cases than courts that rely on small cadres of professionals-on
staff or otherwise. This would be a consideration of great significance to a
court that believed deeply in the value (to litigants, as well perhaps as to itself)
of its ADR processes and that believed that it could maintain anappropriate
level of quality control over a large pool of neutrals. 99
Second, models that use large and diverse pools of neutrals are superior
vehicles for extending the reach and influence of ADR into more segments of
our society. This is accomplished in two ways. One is by having the court's
program directly serve a larger, more diverse group of cases-so more
litigants, in a wider range of circumstances, are exposed to the value and the
philosophy of ADR. The second way these models extend the influence of
ADR is by the effect that training and service has on the way the neutrals in
98 The model in which the court sends the parties into the private sector to retain a
neutral, perhaps from a list the court maintains, could be included among those that offer
the advantages described in this paragraph.
99 There are two very different grounds on which a court might base a conclusion that
it could maintain an appropriate level of quality control over a large pool of neutrals: the
court could commit substantial resources and effort to quality control measures (e.g.,
training or monitoring), or the court could believe that bright, conscientious professionals
serving as neutrals do not need much quality control. I do not know whether, or to what
extent, the latter view is justified.
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the program conduct themselves even when they are not serving as neutrals.
The theory is that, once trained in ADR service, the neutrals will approach
their other professional work (e.g., for lawyers, the other cases they litigate)
with both the tools and the spirit of the ADR process in which they have been
"indoctrinated."
We also confront something of a mixed picture when we examine the
models' relative capacity to attract neutrals who have the appropriate set of
attributes. While I am inclined to give a slight edge to the staff-neutral model,
there are so many factors at play here that I have little confidence in this
feeling. Models that rely on essentially pro bono service by experienced
professionals have attracted very high quality neutrals-at least when the court
asks them to serve only a few times a year. And it is not clear why high
quality people could not be recruited by a court that pays neutrals (or firms of
neutrals) at approximately market rates. The model that inspires the least
confidence from this perspective is the model in which the court requires
litigants to find and pay a neutral from the private sector.
It is not clear which model promises the greatest ability to retain the
services of high quality neutrals. The risk of bum-out among staff-neutrals
may be real, but also may lend itself to exaggeration. The risk that volunteers
who serve only occasionally will drift away from a program also is real-but
its magnitude remains unclear. And while one would expect occasional
volunteers to bring considerable enthusiasm and energy to their neutraling
work, there is some risk that they will be distracted or pulled away by their
"real" jobs before the ADR process has exhausted its capacity to benefit the
parties. Courts that can sustain the flow of payment at market rates to
professional service providers might be best able to retain the services of high
quality neutrals over time-but it is not clear that there are many such courts,
or, at least, that ADR programs so funded could afford to service significant
numbers of cases.
The neutrals' motivation to give a lot of themselves to their work, and the
influence of performance enhancing incentives, appear greatest under the
staff-neutral model-and, perhaps, under the model in which the court pays
the neutrals at or near market rates. On the other hand, potentially role
distorting pressures also may be greatest under these models. The model in
which the neutrals would appear to be least vulnerable to such pressures is the
model in which the court arranges to have an outside organization orchestrate
the delivery of the ADR services. The staff-neutral model probably creates the
greatest risk that the parties will equate the neutral with the court-an equation
that could either enhance or distort how the parties behave in the ADR
process.
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The staff-neutral model is clearly superior to most others in the two
remaining arenas I have considered. This model promises to develop more
sophisticated neutrals (people with more refined and sensitive process skills
and a wider range of neutraling tools) faster than any other model-save,
perhaps, a model under which a court pays market rates to professionals who
work regularly in the ADR field. Neutrals working in these two models also
are most likely, over time, to retain and to use appropriately their process
skills and techniques.
The staff-neutral model offers far and away the most reliable and least
expensive performance quality control. It is under that system that courts can
have the most confidence that the way their neutrals carry out their work
conforms to the procedural protocols and rules the courts have established.
Finally, adopting the staff-neutral model also enables courts to avoid having
to develop and administer potentially burdensome and intrusive systems for
regulating service by providers from the private sector.
I close by re-acknowledging that I have not addressed a good many
practical and other considerations that courts that are trying to choose between
these models need to take into account. I hope, however, that this Essay will
prove useful-by helping policymakers identify for themselves the values that
they want to play the dominant roles when they decide how to structure the
delivery of ADR services in their court or court system.

